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No. 74--3413.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 20, 1975.
A class action was instituted on be-

half of all black persons who had taken
and failed the Georgia bar examination,
contending that the examination was unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds. The United States
District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, at Atlanta, William C. O'KelIey, J., granted summary judgment holding the examination constitutional, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held, inter
alia, that the bar examination was not
intentionally discriminatory, that it was
not inherently discriminatory by virtue
of the disproportionate number of black
applicants for admission to the bar who
failed it, and that the failure to provide
any procedure for review of a failing
grade at the behest of the examinee did
not constitute a denial of due process of
law.

Adams, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2481
In view of undisputed evidence of
anonymity of grading process, allegations in class action brought on behalf of
all black persons who had taken and
failed the Georgia bar examination, to
effect that bar examiners utilized examination as device to purposefully discriminate against prospective black attorneys
on basis of race, presented .no genuine
issue of material fact which would require trial, and summary judgment was
therefore properly entered against plaintiffs. U .S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Constitutional Law <ll::=>208(1)

Discriminatory motivation, even if
proved, is not in itself a constitutional
violation, and becomes so i>nly wht:n it is
given opportunity to manifest itself in
discriminatory conduct. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2470.2

In opposing motion for summary
judgment, party is entitled not only to
have facts viewed in light most favorable to it but also to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from these
facts; inferences nonmoving party seeks
to draw, however, must be reasonable.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c), 28 U.S.
C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <ll::=>2481
In suit in which plaintiff contended,
inter alia, that Georgia bar examiners
utilized bar examination as device to
purposefully discriminate against prospective black attorneys on basis of race,
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inference that use by black applicants of
"Black English" idiom presented viable
opportunity for examiners to engage in
overt racial discrimination against blacks
was unreasonable as matter of law and
therefore insufficient basis upon which
to deny motion for summary judgment
against plaintiffs. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
rule 66(c), 28 l!.S.C.A.

5. Federal Civil Procedure ~2470.2
In determining, for purposes of considering motion for summary judgment,
whether factual inference which party
seeks to draw is a reasonable one, court
need not ignore existence of other evidence of record which tends to make
that inference more or less plausible.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56(c, e, f), 28
U.S.C.A.
6. Constitutional Law <::=215
Traditional equal protection analysis,
not standards developed by Equal Employment Opportunity O>mmission for
employment testing covered by title VI
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, was proper
standard for judging allegations that
Georgia bar examination inherently denied equal pr;tection of the law to black
applicants because of much greater rate
at which they failed examination; there
WM therefore no basis for a holding that
bar examination was required to be professionally validated or that bar examiners were required to demonstrate unavailability of alternative means of measuring professional competence.
Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq. as
amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

7. Constitutional Law ~208(1)
Hallmark of rational classification is
not merely that it differentiates, but
that it does so on basis having fair and
substantial relationship to purposes of
classification.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14.

8. Constitutional Law <::=215
"Rational relationship" test was
properly applied to judge contention that
Georgia bar examination inherently denied equal protection of law to black ap.plicants because of greater rate at which
they failed examination, despite contention that "compelling state interest" test
was proper because disproportionate
passing rate of black and white applicants on examination served to create
suspect classification based on race such
as is needed to trigger strict judicial
scrutiny. U .S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
9. Constitutional Law <::=215
Otherwise legitimate classification
does not become constitutionally suspect
merely because greater number of racial
minority fall in group disadvantaged by
classification.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14.

10. Civil Rights <::= 13.13(3)
Statistical evidence of disparate racial impact alone may establish prima
facie case of racial discrimination, shifting to defendant burden of demonstrating that invidious discrimination was not
among reasons for his action.

11. Attorney and Client <::=4
State has legitimate and substantial
interest in excluding from practice of
law those persons who do not meet its
standard of minimal competence.
12. Attorney and Client <::=6
Georgia bar examination tests skills
and knowledge which have logical, apparent relationship to those necessary in
practice of law.
13. Constitutional Law <::=208(1)
While party defending classification
subject to strict judicial scrutiny must
demonstrate that state has no other
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available alternative which impinges less
on protected interest involved, focus of
rational relationship test is not whether
state has superior means available to accomplish its objectives, but whether
means it has chosen is reasonable one.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
14. Attorney and Client <2=6
Georgia bar examination was not irrationally administered because its outcome depended heavily on subjective
grading judgments of examiners.

15. Federal Civil Procedure <2=2481
In action in which plaintiffs alleged
that Georgia state bar examination illega11y discriminated against blacks, arguments that examiners should unifonnly
be required to use model answers and
predetennined standards in grading
were merely suggestions for improvement and did not raise fact issue as to
whether examination itself was rational.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
16. Attorney and Client 41=6
In proceeding in which plaintiffs
contended that Georgia state bar examination works to discriminate against
blacks, irrationality of examination was
not shown by practice of board of law
examiners in the grading failing papers
falling close to passing mark or in comparing examination results with law
school records as infonnal check of examiners' perfonnance.

practice law and was not inherently discriminatory against blacks by virtue of
mere fact that examination was failed
by much higher percentage of black than
whites. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
19. Constitutional Law <~=287
Primarily because unqualified right
to retake examination at its next regularly scheduled administration both satisfied purpose of hearing and afforded its
protection, black applicants for admission
to practice of law were not denied due
process by virtue of fact that they were
denied any procedure for review of failing grade in bar examination. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
20. Constitutional Law 41=305(2)
While opportunity to be heard is
generally considered fundamental component of due process, entitlement to
rehearing does not automatically flow
from finding that procedural due process
is applicable. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

21. Constitutional Law ~
Whether due process requires particular procedure in given situation must
be detennined by balancing individual's
interest in avoiding loss which lack of
procedure inflicts upon him against interest which government seeks to advance by denying it. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14.

17. Attorney and Client <~=6
It was not irrational for law examiners to compare results of bar examination with law school records as one informal, after-the-fact means of judging
quality of examination.

Appeals fn_>m the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia.

18. Attorney and Client 41=6
Georgia bar examination had rational relationship to applicant's fitness to

DYER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a broad-based
challenge to the constitutionality of the

Before GEWIN, DYER and ADAMS:
Circuit Judges.

• Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
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Georgia bar examination on due process
The central focus of this litigation
and equal protection grounds. This suit clearly is that black applicants as a class
before us, which has been certified by have traditionally experienced particular
the district court as a class action on difficulty in passing the Georgia bar exbehalf of all black persons who have tak- amination. This unfortunate situation
en and flll1ed the Georgia bar examina- reached a nadir in July, 1972, when each
tion and bav.e not been admitted to the of the 40 black applicants taking the expractice of law in Georgia, as well as all . amination failed. On the February and
black persons who will take the exami- July, 1973, examinations, slightly more
nation in the future, results from the than one-half the black applicants were
consolidation of several suits brought by unsu~essful, as compared to a failure
black individuals who have been unsuc- rate of roughly one-fourth to one-third
among white examinees.
cessful on the examination.
Appellants' challenges to the constituSummarized briefly, the Georgia bar
examination is a two-day test adminis- tionality of the bar examination fall into
tered biannually by the Georgia State three major areas. They claim: 1) that
the examiners have used the bar examiBoard of Bar Examiners (the Board), a
group of five practicing lawyers appoint- nation to purposefully discriminate
ed by the Georgia Supreme Court. Since against black applicants on the basis of
February, 1972, the examination has race; 2) that the bar examination inherbeen composed one-half of essay ques- ently violates the fourteenth amendtions prepared and graded by the bar ment's equal protection clause because of
examiners, and one-half of the multiple the highly disparate passing rates of
choice Multistate Bar Examination black and white applicants; and 3) that
(MBE), prepared and graded by the N a- the examination violates due process betiona! Conference of Bar Examiners cause there is no procedure for review of
(NCBE), and administered simultaneous- a failing grade.
Following extensive discovery by both
ly to bar examinees in a majority of
sides which lasted several months, the
states~ Following grading, the scores on
the essay and MBE portions of the ex- district court granted summary judgment to appellees on each of these
amination are combined into a final
grade according to one of three formulas claims. Mter careful consideration of
recommended by the NCBE and selected the r ecord, we conclude that that court
by the Board. It has also been the prac- was correct in holding that there were
tice of the Board, prior to final certifica- no genuine issues of material fact to be
tion of the examination results, to con- resolved and that appellees were entitled
vene and regrade failing papers which to judgment as a matter of law. We
meet certain criteria such as falling close therefore affirm its judgment.
to the minimum passing score of 70, receiving a passing grade from a certain I. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
minimum number of examiners, or being
[1] Appellants' first major contention
recommended for regrading by an exam- is that the bar examiners utilize the exiner. A1J a result of this reconsideration, amination as a device to purposefully
a previously failing grade is on occasion discriminate against prospective black
raised to a passing score. No other re- attorneys on the basis of race. The disview of a grade is provided.
trict court found this allegation to be
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"totally without factual foundation," and
hence appropriate for summary disposition. We agree that it presents no genuine issue of material fact which would
require a trial.
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[2] In so holding, we are mindful of
the Supreme Court's admonition that
"summary procedures should be used
sparingly
where motive and
intent play leading roles." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 1962, 368
U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d
458. However, discriminatory motivation, even if proved, is not in itself a
constitutional
violation,
Palmer
v.
Thompson, 1971, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct.
1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438, and becomes so
only when given the opportunity to manifest itself in discriminatory conduct.
Accordingly, appellees undertook to negate the materiality of intent as an issue
of fact in this case not merely by deny. ing racial animus but also by affirmatively demonstrating their inability to
discover an applicant's race before grading had been completed.
The bulk of the evidence on this point
was introduced through the deposition of
Estes, an employee of the Georgia Supreme Court serving as Administrative
Assistant to the Board, and the official
primarily responsible for implementing
the procedures designe_d to insure anonymity in the grading process. The substance of Estes' testimony was that
1.

It was Estes' practice to open the container
and begin matching names and numbers while
the examiners were engaged in regrading.
This matching was limited solely to numbers
which the examiners had previously certified
as having passed the examination; none of
those not certified as passing were matched,
whether the examination paper was being regraded or not. Moreover, the examiners were
not notified of the status of any examinee until
a decision had been reached on all papers.
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while applicants are seated alphabetically and identified by name cards in the
examination room, examination papers
are identified and graded by number
only. These numbers are drawn at random on individual cards by the applicants, who write their names on the
cards and place them in sealed envelopes.
These envelopes are then collected,
sealed in a container in the examination
room, and kept in the container in his
custody throughout the grading process.1
This testimony, which was uncontradicted,% was sufficient to show the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact as
to the examiners' direct access to information concerning an examinee's race
during grading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Despite the examiners' inability to directly discover an applicant's race, appellants contend that a fact issue regarding
intentional racial discrimination is iruerentially raised by the deposition of Dr. J.
L. Dillard, linguist and author of Black

English: Its History and Usage in the
United States (1972). According to Dr.
Dillard, many black persons tend to
speak an English variant, characterized
by structures such as the pre-verbal use
of "been", which has been coined Black
English. While all formal education,
and in particular that at predominantly
black institutions, attempts to inculcate
Standard English usage rather Black
English, Dr. Dillard opined that a person
2.

Appellants attempted to counter this . testimony with, for example, evidence that the "A"
envelo pes in which names and numbers were
sealed were not completely opaque. But this
evidence in no way speaks to the fact that the
"A" envelopes were placed in another sealed
container in the examination room. Thus, any
person wishing to look into these envelopes
for discriminatory purposes would have to examine them individually in the examination
room, in full view of Board officials, exam
monitors, and the examinees.
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who had spoken this dialect during his
youth might revert to it under situations
of extreme time pressure, such as during
a bar examination. From this testimony
appellants wish us to draw the twin fac. tual inferences that black applicants utilized a 1) unique and 2) recognizable
writing style on the examination, providing the bar examiners with the opportunity to intentionally discriminate against
black examinees, and hence raising a
fact issue a.~· to whether they had actually done so.
[3] In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party is entitled not only
to have the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to it but also to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
from these facts. Harvey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 5 Cir. 1968, 388
F.2d 123, 1.24---25; Liberty Leasing Co. v.
Hillsum Sales Corp., 5 Cir. 1967, 380 F .2d
1013, 1014-15. The inferences the nonmoving party seeks to draw, however,
must be "reasonable," and it is in this
respect that we find Dr. Dillard's deposition insufficient to controvert appellees'
properly supported motion for summary
judgment.
[4] A major reason is that the deposition itself directly contradicts both inferences appellants would have us draw
from it. In response to questioning by
appellees' counsel regarding the racial
uniqueness of Black English, Dr. Dillard
testified that the incidence of the dialect
was not limited to blacks, but was, in his
words, "a major factor that differentiates so-called Southern dialect." He spe3.

Appellants also contend that Black English
may result in overt discrimination even if the
examiner does not r ecognize its use as a racial
characteristic but merely reacts ne gatively be·
cause he conceives it to be incorrect. As this
claim Is equally susceptible to all of the other
reasons we cite for concluding that no materi-

cifically testified that some southern
whites would use similar or identical
grammatical construction and that for
those whiles who had learned this patois
in their youths, "(t]he tre nds of reversion
are the same, of course." On the issue
of the dial ect's racial recognizability, Dr.
Dillard testified that it was highly unlike ly that an individual untrained in linguistics would recognize the use of Black
English as a "black" chara cteristic, or
indeed as anything other than incorrect
standard English. 3 Both of these observations, which are in direct contradiction
to the use of Dr. Dillard's linguistic theories which appellants wish to make in
this lawsuit, in our view render the inf e rence that Black English presents a
viable opportunity for the Board to engage in overt racial discrimination unreasonable as a matter of law.
[5] Two other factors support this
conclusion. First, in determining whether a factual inference a party seeks to
draw is a reasonable one, we need not
ignore the existence of other evidence of
record which tends to make that inference more or less plausible. First Nation! Bank v. Cities Service Co., 1968, 391
U.S. Z53, 284-86, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20
L .Ed.2d 569. Here, such relevant record
evide nce is the MBE, which has comprised one-half of the Georgia bar examination since February, 1972. The significance of the MBE, as a multiple
choice test, is that its scores are immune
to any varia tion arising from the use of
Black English. 4
After perusing the
al issue of fact exists on this claim, we need
not address ourselves to its intrinsic merits.
4.

Dr. Dillard specifically testified that a background in Black English would have no adverse effect on an educated individual's comprehension of even very difficult standard English.
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MBE results, the district court observed
that on the July, 1972 examination,
when each of the 40 black applicants
failed, only one passed the MBE but
failed the examination as a whole. It
also noted that the results on subsequent
examinations were comparable and that
the director of testing of the NCBE had
testified that it would be impossible for
a state board of examiners to set the
cutoff score so as to intentionally
achieve this result.
Obviously, these
facts also tend to seriously undercut the
inference that the difficulty of black applicants on the examination is due to
language bias arising from the use of
Black English. In the words of the Supreme Court in First National, supra,
they "conclusively show that the facts
upon which (appellants relied] to support
[their] allegation were not susce ptible of
the interpretation which [they] sought to
give them." 391 U .S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. at
1593.
Finally, this is not a case where the
substitution of speculative inferences for
the "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial" de manded by
Rule 56(e) is to be treated indulgently.
See Smith v. Local 25, Sheet Metal
Workers, 5 Cir. 1974, 500 F.2d 741, 749.
Fed.RCiv.P. 56(f) requires that a party
unable to show facts essential to his opposition present to the court the reasons
for its inability to produce such evidence.
Here there was not only no request for
further discovery, but the record affirmatively shows that appellants were furnished with the examination papers written by all applicants on the July, 1972
examination. Thus, were there more

a.

Appellants also argue that we may find the
bar examiners guilty of "intentional'' discrimination merely for having continued to administer the examination with knowledge of its adverse Impact on black applicants. This is of

than surmise to the asserted connection
between Black English and the poor
showing of black bar applicants, appellants had both the means and the duty
tO bring the pertinent facts forward.
Their failure to do so cannot be construed as creating a fact issue precluding
summary judgme nt. 5
II. INHERENT DISCRIMINATION
Appellants' second contention is that,
irrespective of intent, the Georgia bar
examination inherently denies equal protection of the laws to black applicants
because of the much greater rate at
which they fail the examination. The
two major issues that we must resolve in
connection with this claim are: 1) the
standard of judicial review which is applicable when only disparate performance by race has been shown, and 2)
whether a material issue of fact remains
that the applicable standard had been
satisfied. As is frequently the case in
equal protection suits, the first issue
largely controls the second.
The district court determined that the
appropriate standard of review was the
"rational relationship" test, and that the
Georgia bar examination satisfied this
norm as a matter of law. For reasons
that shall appear, we agree with the district court's ultimate conclusion on both
points.
[6] Appellants' primary suggestion is
that we should not view the Georgia bar
examination within the framework of
traditional equal protection . analysis at
all, but should instead apply by analogy
the standards developed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
course no more than a sophisticated restatement of the claim that the bar examination is
inherently unconstitutional, which we treat in
Part II, infra.

I

I
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for employment testing covered by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (EEOC
guidelines). As construed by the Supreme Court in Gri~ v. Duke Power
Co.,. 1971, 401 U.S.
, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28
L.:f;d.2d 158, Title VII precludes the use
of testing procedures which disproportionately exclude protected minorities,
regardless ·of intent or motivation, unless
th~y are "demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance." ld. at
436, 91 S.Ct. at 856. Under the pertinent EEOC guidelines, which we have
recognized to be a highly persuasive interpretation of Title VII, United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 5 .C ir. 1973, 474
F .2d 906, 913,
[t]he use of any test which adversely
affects hiring, promotion, _transfer or
any other employment or ~~mbership
opportunity of classes protected by Title VII constitutes discrimination unless: (a) the test has been validated
and evidences a high degree of utility
as hereinafter described, and (b) the
person giving or acting upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring,
transfer or promotion procedures are
unavailable for his use.
29 C.F.R § 1607.3 {1974). Since it is
undisputed that the G€orgia bar examination has a greater adverse impact on
bl~ applicants than on whites and has
never been the subject of a professional
validation study, acceptance of appellants' suggested standard of review
would inexorably compel the conclusion
that the examination is unconstitutional.
C.

Douglas v. Hampton, D .C.Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d
976; Davis v. Washington, D.C.Cir. 1975, 512
F.2d 956; Walston v. County School Board, 4
Cir. 1974, 492 F.2d 919; United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 4 Cir. 1973, 484
F.2d 70; Castro v. Beecher. 1 Cir. 1972, 459

Title VII does not apply by its terms,
of course, because the Georgia Board of
Bar Examiners is neither an "employer,"
an "employment agency," nor a "labor
organization" within the meaning of the
statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e. Nonethe- ll
less, appellants argue that it is appropriate to look to Title VII and its implementing guidelines to flesh out the fourteenth amendment equal protection
guarantee both because the statute and
the amendment share the common goal
of interdicting racial discri-mination and
beca,.w>e the bar examination is in reality
an "employment test;" indeed, they
point out that the stakes are much higher than in an ordinary employment testing situation because failure results not
in the loss of a specific job opportunity
but in denial of the right to practice law
in an entire state.
Quite understandably, appellees take
the position that whether or not the bar
examination meets the standards of a
facially inapplicable statute is simply irrelevant to its constitutionality. This
observation would ordinarily be all the
discussion the point would warrant.
However, as authority for their argument that Title VII and the fourteenth
amendment should be equated, appellants have cited to us a number of
Courts of Appeals decisions from other
Circuits which have utilized the fourteenth amendment to apply Title VII
and the EEOC guidelines virtually verbatim to employment tests administered
by various public agencies.' We have
given these decisions careful considera- '
tion, but on close analysis we conclude ·
F.2d 725; Chance v. Board of Examiners, 2
Cir. 1972, 458 F.2d 1167; Carter v. Gallagher, '
8 Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 315, mod. 1972, 452 F.2d
327 (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92
S .Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338. .

._,
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there are several fundamental reasons
why their principles cannot be extended
to reach the Georgia bar examination as
appellants suggest.
The ill"St of these reasons is that,
viewed in the perspective of their somewhat unique factual context, the cases
on which appellants rely do not necessarily stand for the sweeping propositions
for which they cite them. The courts
which have treated the fourteenth
amendment and Title VII as embodying
fungible standards have done so only in
the narrow context of employment tests
administered by governmental entities
such as police and fire departments.
This is significant because Title VII, as
originally enacted, provided a specific
exemption from the Act's requirements
for governmental units. Thus, in suits
involving challenges to the personnel
practices of public agencies, ·courts were
ft:e<Iuently confronted by the anomalous
situation of a public employer who was
theoretically free to engage in selection
practices which would be clearly illegal
for a private employer under Title VII.
But prior to the time of appellate deci-.
sion in each of these cases but Carter v.
Gallagher, supra, this anomaly had been
potentially removed by Congress' enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92- 261, 86
Stat. 103, which deleted the governmental exemption from Title VII and clearly
~pressed Congressional intent to reach
the employment practices of the agencies
in question; however, direct Title VII
relief was still barred by the fact that
the complaints had been filed prior to
the 1972 amendments to the Act.

I

The ,res~nse of some courts was to
bridge this gap by VIrtually incor.£2[.ating Tifle- vu ana the EEOC guidelines

I

VICKEk1
into the fourteenth amendrrent. Whatever the justl1ication for this !ipproach in
these narrow circumstances, we think it
overly simplistic to read these decisions,
as lJ.ppellant would have us do, as authority for the general proposition that
Title VII and the equal protection clause
should be read interchangeably whenever the goals to be served are the same
and the subject matter is at least arguably related, particularly when the decisions have not been read so broadly by
the Circuits that rendered them. 7•
A second important consideration is
that the cases on which appellants rely
do not state the controlling law of this
Circuit, but are in fact contrary to it.
We confronted the issue of testing for
public employment in Allen v. City of
Mobile, 5 Cir. 1972, 466 F.2d 122, which
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a written test used by the Mobile, Alabama police department as part
of its requirements for promotion to the
rank of sergeant. The district court sustained this test despite a showing of demonstrable adverse impact on blacks. In
doing so, it recognized the relevance of
Griggs' holding that tests which disadvantage ·minorities should be job-related,
but declined to use this as a springboard
to apply the full panoply of EEOC
guidelines to a test falling outside the
scope of Title VII; it specifically refused
to require that the test be professionally
validated. Instead, the court personally
examined the challenged test and caneluded that the skills it measured, such
as reading and comprehension, memory,
note-taking and verbal skills, were useful
attributes for a policeman, particularly
one in a supervisory position. Based on
this conclusion, it upheld the test on the
ground that "[i]t bears a rational rela~
tionship to the ability to perfonn the

7. See note 9, infra.
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work required." Allen v. City of Mobile,
S.D.Ala.1971, 331 F.Supp. 1134, 1146.
On appeal, the sole issue was whether
the district court had applied the correct
legal standard in dealing with the test.
We affirmed per curiam, on the basis of
the district court's order and decree.
Moreover, Judge Crt>ldberg's dissenting
opinion removed any remaining doubt
that, in affirming, we squarely confronted and rejected the contention that Title
VII and its implementing EEOC guidelines were applicable to testing outside
the scope of the Act. In an exhaustive
opinion, Judge Goldberg argued that the
majority had erred in declining to follow
precisely the cases on which appellants
rely and in refusing to hold, as had they,
that Title VII standards may be applied
by analogy through the fourteenth
amendment.
Thus, were the precise issue decided by
the cases on which appellants rely before
us today, we would be compelled to reject their holdings on the authority of
our decision in Allen. See McClure v.
First Nat1 Bank, 5 Cir. 1974, 497 F.2d
490, 492. Needless to say, this faet "lrlso
makes appellants' cases somewhat less
than persuasive authority in this Circuit.
However, even were we not constrained by Allen, we would view a subsequent Supreme Court decision, which
declined the opportunity to equate the
equal protection clause and Title VII in
a similar situation, as the most persuasive authority on the proper relationship between t
an
nth
amendment. I Geduldig v. Aiello 1974,
417 u.s. 484,
.Ed.2d
256, the Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether the California Unemployment Compensation Disability
Fund could, consonantly with the equal
protection clause, exclude disabilities associated with normal pregnancy from

the fund's coverage. While this stateadministered plan was outside the scope
of Title VII, as is the Georgia bar examination, this precise issue was the subject
of an EEOC regulation promulgated pursuant to Title VII, which stated in pertinent part that ".
. payment under
any
temporary disability plan
. , formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b)(1974)
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that since normal pregnancy is an
obj ectively identifiable physical condition, distinctions involving pregnancy do
not constitute sex-based classifications
unless they are shown to be mere pretexts for invidious discrimination against
one sex or the other. By applying the
rational relationship test, the COurt then
lOund that California's exclusion of such
disabilities from the fund's coverage was
consistent with the equal protection
clause. But perhaps more significant
than its holding is the fact that, in
reaching its conclusion that "this case is
thus a far cry from cases . .
~
volving discnmmah on · based on ender
as~h,"
. at
n.
S.Ct. at
2492, the Court felt it necessary neither
to distingu·ish nor even to mention the
EEOC's contrary view under Title VII,
even though under appellants' suggested
analysis the EEOC guideline would have
conclusively established that the exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities
constitu !fti~legal sex discrimination. In
our vi ~~ unmistakable import of the
S.!!£;eme COurt's_ methOd of analysis_ is
that a constitutionaT cha llenge "tO ,g.
method of classification must be decided
by constitutional standards, and t hat
wfiite 1he EEOC guidelines are entitled
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to ~ deference in detennining what
~ in£ended: tZ accomphsfitfirgugh
Title£[, Albemarle P aper CO. v. Moody,
1975, U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 2362, 44
L.Ed..2d - - , they do not carry similar
weight in intemreh ng the mlmmum
rommands of t ile fourteenth amendment.
Our reading of this dec1s1on is in accord with recent decisions of other Circuits. As might be expected, the continuing viability of the EEOC temporary
disability guidelines following Geduldig
was drawn into question by a number of
employers who argued essentially the
other side of the coin appellants urge
here; i. e., since differing treatment of
pregnancy-related disabilities is not invidiously discriminatory for the purposes
of the equal protection clause, neither
should it be considered discriminatory
for the purposes of Title VII. To date,
this contention has been consirlered by
the Second, Third, and most recently, the
Fourth Circuits; all have rejected the
facile equation of Title VII and the fourteenth amendment. As the Second Circuit put it:
Title VII is legislation of this nature, designed to prohibit a broad
spectrum of discriminatory evils which
Congress deemed would have such an
adverse effect. There is no requirement that the discriminatory practices
forbidden by this statute should be
limited to practices violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Practices
forbidden by Title VII and the EEOC
guidelines issued thereunder may,
nonetheless, be able to survive Equal ·
Protection attack.

Communications Workers of America v.
American T. & T., 2 Cir. 1975, 513 F ..2d
1024, 1031 (emphasis added). Accord,
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 3 Cir.
1975, 511 F.2d 199, cert. granted, U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 1989, 44 L.Ed.2d 476;
Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 4 Cir.
1975, - - F .2d - .1 This is of course
the crux of our refusal to measure the
constitutionality of the Georgia bar examimi.tion by Title VII standards.'
[7] But because we find no basis for
holding that a bar examination must be
professionally validated or that bar examiners are required to demonstrate the
unavailability of alternative means of
measuring professional competence, see
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974), does not mean
that the "job-relatedness" of an examina tion has no relevance tO its constitutionality. The hallmark of a rational
classification is not merely that it dj..fferentiates, but that it does so on a ba.sis
having a fair and substantial relationship
to the purposes of the classification.
Reed v. Reed, 1971, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct.
251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225. What we do hold,
however, is that the necessary relationship must be detennined by constitutional, not statutory, standards."
[8, 9] Assuming we find that traditional methods of equal protection analysis are applicable, appellants alternatively contend that the correct standard of
review is not the "rational relationship"
test relied on by the district court, but
the "compelling state interest" test utilized when state action creates a racial
or other "suspect classification" or impinges on a judicially-declared "fund&.

II. Although not necessary to our reliance on
them, each of these decisions also found the
EEOC guidelines on treatment of pregnancy
related disabilities to be a valid interpretation
of Title VII.

9.

Significantly, two of the Circuits on whose
decisions appellants rely are among the three
which have refused to equate Title VII and the
fourteenth amendment in interpreting Geduldjg.

II.

See text accompanying note 11, J.nlra.
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mental interest."
The gravamen of
their argument is that the disproportionate passing rates of black and white applicants on the examination serve to create the classification based on race which
is needed to trigger strict judicial scrutiny. The difficulty with this position,
however, is that it stands in the face of
a clear body of Jaw holding that an otherwise legitimate classification does not
become constitutionally "suspect" simply
. l>ecause greater numbers of a racial minority fall in the group disadvantaged by
the classiilcation. Jefferson v. Hackney,
1972, 406 U .S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32
L.Ed.2d 285; James v. Valtierra, 1971,
402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L .Ed .2d
678. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, supra (pregnancy not necessarily a sex-based classification even though only women may
become pregnant).
James, for example, concerned the
constitutionality of a California constitutional provision which required approval
by referendum for low-income housing
projects. One of the plaintiffs' primary
strategies in attacking this constitutional
provision was to attempt to bring it
within the ambit of Hunter v. Erickson,
1969, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21
L.Ed.2d 616, which only two years before
had struck down a city charter amendment requiring voter approval of certain
antidiscrimination ordinances on the
ground that the amendment created a
classification based on race. The James
plaintiffs argued, successfully at the
three-judge court level, that the California provision likewise created a racial
classification because of the high statistical correlation between the poor and racial minorities.
The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the analogy and reversed, stating:
Unlike [Hunter], it cannot be said
that California's Article XXXIV rests

on "distinctions based on race." ld., at
391, 89 S.Ct. (557] at 561. The Article
requires referendum approval for any
low-rent public housing project, not
only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority. And the
r ecord here would not support any
claim that a law see mingly neutral on
its fact is in fact aimed at a racial
minority. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U .S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L .Ed.2d
110 (1960). The prese nt case could be
affirmed only by extending Hunter,
and this we decline to do.
402 U.S. at 141, 91 S.Ct. at 1333.
Likewise, in Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, the Court brushed aside the "naked
statistical argument'' that it was unconstitutional to fund an AFDC program at
a lower percentage of recognized need
than other categories of assistance because of the higher percentage of minority recipients in the AFDC category with
the observation that
[t]he acceptance of appellants' constitutional theory would render suspect
each difference in treatment among
the grant classes, however lacking in
racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be.
Few legislative efforts to deal with
the difficult problems posed by current
welfare programs could survive such
scrutiny, ~nd we do not find it required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
406 U.S. at 548-49, 92 S .Ct. at 1732.
Appellants seek to avoid the thrust of
these decisions by arguing that they are
distinguishable as "social welfare" decisions. Noting that the Supreme Court
has frequently held that states are to be
allowed greater latitude in formulating
economic and social welfare policy than
in other areas, Geduldig, supra, 417 U.S.
at 495, 94 S.Ct. 2485; Dandridge v. Wil-
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Iiams, 1970, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87, 90
S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 they remind
us that the right to practice law in Georgia is not a resource which the state may
-either conserve or allocate. However,
this purported distinction misses the
point. The difference between economic
and social welfare cases and others lies
in the precision with which the state is
required to draw classifications in seeking to achieve its objectives,. and not in
the amount of adverse impact on minority groups which is permissible before an
otherwise legitimate classification becomes constitutionally "suspect."

Thus, for example, a state may constiPitionally presume that widows are more
ill need of financial assistance than widowers when legislating a property tax
exemption, Kahn v. Shevin, 1974, 416
U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189,
or that AFDC recipients require a lower
percentage of need than those in other
categories of assistance, Jefferson v.
Hackney, supra, despite the fact that
these classifications are demonstrably
both over- and underinclusive; however,
a state may not similarly assume that
men make better estate administrators
than women in the sole interest of eliminating a class of contests for letters of
administration. Reed v. Reed, supra.
But, no one would seriously contend that
any economic resource, however, scarce,
could be conserved by denying its benefits outright to a racial or other suspect
minority.
See Shapiro v. Thompson,
1969, 3W U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322,
1330, 22 L.Ed .2d 600 ("The saving of
welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise
invidious
classification.")
However,
since Georgia bar examinees are not
judged on the basis of broad generalizations, but rather on the basis of individualized determinations of whether each
applicant possesses the minimal compe-

•

-

tence required to practice law, the "social welfare" distinction simply has no
significance in this case.
[10] The foregoing of course does not
mean that any facially neutral method
of classification automatically escapes
more than minimal judicial scrutiny. An
apparently neutral scheme may be merely a subterfuge for invidious discrimination, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1960, 364 '
U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, or
may be discriminatorily applied, Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 1886, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct.
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. Moreover, in appropriate cases this Court has held that statistical evidence of disparate racial impact alone may establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, shifting to
the defendant the burden of demonstrating that invidious discrimination was not
among the reasons for his actions. Compare Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 5
Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 687 with Robinson v.
City of Dallas, 5 Cir. 1975, 514 F.2d 1Z71
[1975]. However, we need not decide if
this is a case where "statistics
tell much, and Courts listen," Alabama v.
United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F.2d 583,
586, aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37, 83
S.Ct. 145, 9 L.Ed.2d 112, because of our
prior conclusion that appellees have
carried their burden under Fed.R.Civ.P.
56 of demonstrating the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact regarding
intentional racial discrimination. Thus,
even were we to assume that the burden
of proof has shifted, it must also be
deemed to have been met.
Since the Georgia bar examination
does not establish a constitutionally suspect racial classification and no claim is
made that a fundamental interest is. involved, there is no legal basis for applying the compelling state interest test and
the proper standard of review becomes
the rational relationship test utilized by
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the distOct court. Appellants nonetheless urge that the district court, which
relied mainly on Schware v. Board of
Examiners, 1957, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct.
752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 as authority for its
standard of review, erred in failing to
apply what they term the somewhat
stricter burden of rationality exemplified
by more recent decisions such as Reed v.
Reed, supra, on the ground that the racial discrimination involved in this case is
even more highly suspect than the gender-based discrimination in Reed.
Appellants' argument for invoking
Reed is, of course, specious. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in Jefferson, supra, 406 U.S. 535, 547, 92 S.Ct.
1724, 1732: "The standard of judicial review is not altered because of appellant's
unproved allegations of racial discrimination." This is not to say that Reed has
no relevance to this appeal; however, its
significance is of little comfort to appellants. In our view, Reed and related
decisions such as Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36
L.Ed.2d 583, serve to reemphasize the
desirability and relative relationality, at
least outside the area of economic and
social welfare programs, of classifications which act directly upon the quality
they purport to measure as compared to
classifications which attempt to achieve
their intended objectives through indirection, often by the use of ill-fitting
and stereotyped generalizations. Since,
as we have previously noted, the Georgia
bar examination provides an individual,
anonymous determination of each applicant's present competence to practice
law, it comports with this aspect of the
teaching of Reed and its progeny. Accordingly, the existence of these intervening decisions in no way denigrates
the district court's reliance on the Supreme Court's earlier statement in

I

I
I

I'

I

!'I
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Schware, supra, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77
S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 · L.Ed.2d 796, th11t "(a]
state can require high standards of qualification such as good moral chara<:ter or
proficiency in its law, before it admits
an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection
with the applicant's fitness or capacity
to practice law," as its source of authority for the appropriate standard of review.
Appellant's final argument regarding
inherent discrimination is that, even if
we should find the district court adopted
the correct standard of review, it im~
properly resolved disputed issues of fact
in reaching its conclusion that the bar
examination possesses a rational connection with an applicant's fitness to practice law. This contention is simply devoid of merit.
~11, 12] Appellants concede, as they 1
must, that the state has a legitimate and
substantial interest in excluding from
the practice of law those persons who do
not meet its standards of minimal com- j
petence and that the Georgia examination, as presently constituted, tests skills
and knowledge which have a "logical,
apparent relationship" to those necessary
to the practice of law.
While appellants valiantly argue otherwise, these facts are sufficient in
themselves to establish the rationality of
the bar examination in the constitutional
sense. If a state has the right to insist
on a minimum standard of legal competence as a condition of licensure, it
would seem to follow a fortiori that it
may require a demonstration of such
competence in an examination designed
to test the fundamental ability to recog·
nize and deal with legal principles.
Another important indicium of rationality is that the Georgia bar examination
satisfies the two criteria of a rational

I
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examination we identified in Annstead
v. Starkville Municipal Separate School
Dist., 5 Cir. 1972, 461 F.2d 276, in which
we held the Graduate Record Examination to be an unconstitutional method for
selecting primary and secondary school
teachers. There we suggested that a rationally supportable examination should
1) be designed for the purpose for which
it is being used, and 2) utilize a cutoff
BCOre related ·to the quality the examination purports to measure. The Georgia
bar examination meets both qualifications. Both the essay and MBE portions
of the examination are designed solely to
assesa the legal competence of bar examinees; and while the minimum passing
score of 70 has no significance standing
alone, it represents the examiners' considered judgments as to "minimal competence required to practice law," the precise quality the examination attempts to
measure. 11

-
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involved, see, e. g., Shelton v. Tucker,
1960, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5
L.Ed.2d 231, the focus of the rational
relationship test is not whether the state
has superior means available to accomplish its objectives, but whether the
means it has chosen is a reasonable one.
Viewed from this perspective, appellants'
asserted "fact issues" are simply not material.

[13] The disputed fact issues whJCh
appellants claim necessitate a trial, such
as whether the bar examination covers a
sufficiently broad domain of subject
matter or tests an adequate range of
legal skills, are at botton only claims
that the examination could be improved.
While the difference between minimal
and strict scrutiny is necessarily a matter of degree, this argument overlooks
one of the most fundamental distinctions
between the two standards of reviewthe relevance of the availability of alternative means. While a party defending
a classification subject to strict judicial
scrutiny must demonstrate that the state
has no other available alternative which
impinges less on the protected interest

[14, 15] The same observation applies
to appellants' contentions that the bar
examination is irrationally administered
because its outcome depends so heavily
on the subjective grading judgments of
the examiners. Since subjective, as opposed to objective, grading is a necessary
corollary. to the administration of essaytype questions, an attack on subjective
grading per se must perforce include the
allegation that the use of essay examinations is itself irrational. This contention
has uniformly been rejected by the
courts which have considered it, for reasons succinctly articulated in an unreported opinion granting partial summary
judgment in one of the consolidated actions comprising this appeal. There the
court said:
The relevant question must then be
whether the passing of an examination
made up of subjective, essay-type
questions has a rational connection
with the applicant's ability to practice
law in the State of Georgia. It is
beyond question that it does. While
plaintiff would apparently favor a
more objective type of examination,
much of an attorney's actual work
once admitted into practice involves
the analysis of complicated fact situa-

II. tke also Baker v. Columbus Municipal Sep·
arate School Dist., 5 Cir. 1972, 462 F.2d 1112,
1114-15. While appellants suggest that there
Is language in Baker which indicates that strict
scrutiny is generally applicable to qualifying

examinations, the basis of our holding there
was the affirmance of an explicit finding of
purposeful racial discrimination. For this reason, the compelling state interest test was the
appropriate standard of review m Baker.

--
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tiona and the application thereto of abstract legal principles. Both in legal
practice and with these essay-type
questions, recognition of the legal
problem presented and well-reasoned
explication of the relevant considerations is of utmost importance.
Banks v. Miller, Civil No. 15876 (N.D.Ga.,
August 11, 1972) (footnote omitted). Accord, Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law
Examiners, 7 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 474,
477; Feldman v . State Board of Law
Examiners, 8 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 699,
703; Chaney v. State Bar of California,
9 Cir. 1967, 386 F .2d 962, 964, cert. denied, 1968, 390 U .S. 1011, 88 S.Ct. 1262,
20 L.Ed.2d 162. Appellants' further arguments that the examiners should uniformly be required to use model answers
and pre-determined standards in grading
are again merely suggestions for improvement, and do not raise a fact issue
as to whether the examination itself is
rational.
[16] Finally, we flatly reject appellants' contentions that the Board's practice of regrading failing papers falling
close to the passing mark, or of comparing examination results with law school
records as an informal check on the examiners' performance, is evidence of the
irrationality of the examination. We
fully agree with the statement in appellees' brief that "[t]he Constitution does
not require a perfect test nor should it
require the examiners to act as if the
test were perfect." Indeed, it is curious
logic to condemn the examiners for utilizing practices designed to recognize the
inherent limitations of testing and for
attempting to give the benefit of the
doubt to applicants who may have been
adversely affected by those limitations.
Similarly, we see no infirmity in the fact
that the standards for determining
which papers are to be regraded are not

VICKERY
fixed and immutable and may de~nd in
part upon the exercise of an examiner's
discretion.
[17, 18] Nor do we find it irrational
for the examiners to compare examination results with law school records as
one informal, after-the-fact means of
judging the quality of the examination.
Since Georgia as well as other states requires graduation from law school or its
equivalent as a prerequisite to taking
the bar examination, a requirement
which appellants do not challenge here,
it is certainly reasonable to assume that
legal training is highly instrumental in
developing the qualities that comprise
"minimal competence to practice law"
and that the overall performance of
graduates of various institutions bears
some logical relevance to how well the
examination is measuring these qualities.
The fact remains, of course, that each
applicant's examination is graded. without knowledge of his particular legal
background. Accordingly, we have no
hesitancy in affirming the district court's
holding that the Georgia bar examination "has a rational relationship to an
applicant's fitness to practice law.

"
III.

DUE PROCESS REVIEW

[19] In addition to the equal protection claims we have previously discussed,
appellants also contend that the failure
to provide any procedure for review of a
failing grade at the behest of the examinee constitutes a denial of due process of
law. The district court's view was that
such review is not constitutionally required, primarily because an unqualified
right to retake the examination at its
next regularly scheduled administration
both satisfies the purposes of a hearing
and affords it protection. We agree.
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The safeguards of the due process
clause are of course available to a failing
bar applicant. As the Supreme Court
stated in Schware, supra:
A State cannot exclude a person
from the practice of law or from any
other occupation in a manner or for
reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
535 U.S. at 238---39, 77 S.Ct. at 756.
[20]

While

the

opportunity

to

be

heard is generally considered a fundamental component of due process, entitlement to a hearing does not automatically flow from a finding that procedural due process is applicable. See, e. g .,
N9rth American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 1908, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53
L.Ed.. 195. As the Supreme Court observed in Hannah v. · Larche, 1960, 363
U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1515, 4
L.Ed..2d 1307:
"Due process" is an elusive concept.
Ita exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific
factual
contexts.
Whether the Constitution requires that
a particular right obtain in a specific
proceeding depends upon a complexity
of factors. The nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on
that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account.
[21] In the first instance, whether
due process requires a particular procedure in a given situation must be determined by balancing the individual's interest in avoiding the loss which lack of
the procedure inflicts upon him against
the interests which the government
seeks to advance by denying it. Goldberg v. Kelly, 1970, 397 U.S. 254, 262--63,
90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed..2d 287. In argu-
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ing that this balance should be struck in
favor of allowing a failing bar examinee
a he aring, a ppellants rely heavily on an
applicant's undoubted interest in pursuing his chosen profession. But such reliance misses the mark. While this in·
terest is admittedly a weighty one in
determining whether due process protections are applicable, see Atlanta Attractions, Inc. v. Massell, N.D.Ga.1971, 332
F.Supp. 914, aff'd, 5 Cir. 1972, 463 F .2d
449, it militates similarly in favor of a
hearing only if hearings are demonstrably more efficacious m eans of safeguarding that interest than the unqualified
right of r eexamination which Georgia
currently provides. We think they are
not.
First, since regularly scheduled examinations are held every six months, and
each administration of the examination
produces scores of unsuccessful applicants who would be entitled to hearings,
we think it unlikely that providing a
hearing would afford significantly quicker relief to an erroneously failed applicant than would the right to retake the
examination at its next administration.
Second, we think it likewise unlikely
that a hearing would be significantly
more effective in exposing grading errors than would reexamination. At a
hearing, the issue of course would not be
whether the examiner had given an applicant the "correct" grade, but rather
whether either a mechanical error had
been made in computing the grade or
the grade given by the examiner was
arbitrary, capricious, and without foundation. Since "it is not to be presumed
that powers conferred upon the administrative boards will be exercised arbitrarily," Douglas v. Noble, 1923, 261 U.S. 165,
170, 43 S.Ct. 303, 305, 67 L.Ed. 590, we
may presume that such errors are infrequent. Even making the generous as-
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sumption that one out of every hundred
applicants who take the examination fail
when they should have passed due to
arbitrary grading, the probability that
the same individual would be the victim
of error after two ~xaminations is literally one in a million..IZ Since the hearing process is itself susceptible to error,
we see little advantage to it on this
score.
The one area in which a hearing would
appear to be a superior remedy to reexamination is in removing whatever stigma
may attach to an individual from having
previously failed the bar examination in
the rare case where the failure was unjustified. Such undeserved stigma, however, is not only rare but far removed
factually from that occasioned by the
public "posting'~ as a drunkard which
was involved in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 1971, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, ?:1
L.Ed.2d 515; but more important, it also
presents entirely· different issues than
those involved when an individual is denied admission to the bar on the ground
of moral unfitness. See Willner Y. Committee on Character and Fitness, . 1963,
373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d
224. While an adverse determination on
character and fitness tends to exert a
continuing detrimental effect on an individual's opportunity to be admitted to
practice, unless and until rebutted, failure on a bar examination does not stigmatize an individual as "incompetent,"
but merely indicates that he did not
demonstrate minimal competence on a
particular examination. Upon reexamination, such an individual is entitled to
have his paper graded by the same standards as those of everyone else, and if he
passes, to be admitted on precisely the

VICKERY
same basis as an applicant who had not
previously taken the examination. For
these reasons, we consider the "liberty
interest" a failing examinee has at stake
to be a minor, if not a non~xistent one.
Cf. SirruJ v. Fox, 5 Cir. 1974, 505 F.2d
857, 862-64 (en bane).
In contrast, we find the interests
which the state seeks to advance by substituting reexamination for a hearing to
be substantial. The most important of
these interests is, of course, avoidance of
the administrative burden which a hear- ·
ing requirement would entail. Since, as
we have noted, scores of applicants fail
the Georgia bar examination each time it
is given, and all examiners are involved
in the grading of each paper, the result
of requiring a hearing would be the imposition of what the Seventh Circuit has
described as "an intolerable burden upon
the bar examiners," Whitfield v. Illinois
Board of Bar ·Examiners, 7 Cir. 1974,
504 F.2d 474, 478, especially when one
considers that bar examiners are not
full-time administrators but practicing
attorneys. While such administrative
concerns are not in themselves controlling, they are certainly relevant, Richardson v. Perales, 1971, 402 U .S. 389, 406, 91
S.Ct. 1420, 28 S.Ct. 842, and become particularly so when the gains to be realized
through the imposition of an additional
administrative burden are as minimal as
they are here. Moreover, as Whitfield,
supra, has observed, the initiation of a
hearing requirement as a supplement to,
rather than as a substitute for, the right
of reexamination (as we are certain appellants view their due process claim)
might result in unfair disadvantage to
those applicants taking the examination ·
for the first time.

12. See Comment, Review of Failing Bar Examinations: Does ReeXAmination Satisfy Due Process?,
52 Bos.U.LRev. 286, 301 N. 115.
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Finally, in weighing the "complexity
of factors" which serve to shape the contours of the process which is due here,
we do not write on a clean slate. The
precise issue before us has been considered squarely by one Circuit, Whitfield, supra. 504 F.2d 474, 477- 79; inferentially by another, Chaney v. State Bar
of California, 9 Cir. 1967, 386 F .2d 962,
967, cert. denied, 1968, 390 U .S. 1011, 88
S.Ct. 1262, 20 L.Ed.2d 162; and in dictum by a third, Feldman v. State Board
of Law Examiners, 8 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d
699, 703 n. 6. All have concluded, as
have we, that a hearing is not required.
These decisions, which we consider sound
and well-reasoned, reinforce our conviction that the balance we have struck is
the proper one.
Accordingly, since the record reveals
no disputed issues of material fact and
the applicable principles of law clearly
demonstrate that appellees are entitled
to prevail, the district court's award of
summary judgment to appellees is
Affirmed.
ADAMS, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
Since I believe the majority decision
rests upon a tenuous resolution of pivotal factual issues in a troublesome area of
the law where residual doubts at this
stage of the proceedings should be reaolved in favor of the plaintiffs, I must,
with deference to the comprehensive
opinion of the majority, dissent.

a.
My dissent is based in large measure
on the nature of the uncontradicted facts
1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
"nor shall any State
deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'

which plaintiffs have adva.r.ced to establish a case of racial discrimination viola. tive of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 1
The central focus of this litigation is
that black applicants as a class have for
a period of years experienced a 'severely
disproportionate number of failing marks
on the Georgia bar examination. As the
majority opinion candidly concede.'!, this
situation reached a nadir in July, 1972,
when each of the 40 black applicants
failed; and continued in February and
July, 1973, when more than one-half the
black applicants were unsuccessful, compared to a failure rate of one-fourth to
one-third among white examinees.
b.

The administration of a state policy
that is neutral on its fact but which results in unequal application to those entitled to be treated alike is not in itself a
denial of equal protection. Rather, it
must be demonstrated that there is
present an element of purposeful discrimination. Such purposeful discrimination, however, may be evidenced by a
systematic, long-eontinued pattern of unequal results. 2
A colorable case of purposeful racial
discrimination is set forth where SU3tained de facto discrimination is shown
together with the absence of an investigation, or indeed any effort, by the administrators of the state program in
question to ascertain whether the seemingly purposeful discrimination is intentional in fact or is explainable by the
circumstances. 3 This is so because a pre2.

Snowden v . Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9, 64 S.Ct,
397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1943).

3.

Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct.
1159, 86 J-.Ed. 1559 (1942); Hawkins v. Town
of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5 Cir. 1971).

-

20a -

I
I

TYLER

Y.

sumption of racial inferiority is simply
not permissible.•

c.
Bridgeport Guard. Inc. v. Members of
Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n 5 was a
suit by nearly all the black policemen of
the City of Bridgeport who had not
passed a particular civil service examination. The Second Circuit held that the
defendants had a heavy burden to meet
the plaintiffs' prima facie case of invidious discrimination in view of a practice
that resulted in a disparity of substantial
magnitude between the hiring of whites
and blacks. This Court has stated that
"(w]henever the effect of a law or policy
(use by school district of a 1,000 cut-off
score in the National T eache rs E xamination as a condition of e mployme nt] produces
a [significant] racial
distortion it is subject to strict
scrutiny."'
Based on a fair reading of the pleadings and the depositions here--with all
inferences resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, as required on summary judgment-it would appear that the defendants have not met their burden of disproving purposeful discrimination in the
application of the Georgia bar examination.
The plaintiffs have raised the question
whether black examinees, although initially anonymous, can be racially identified by graders of the essay portion of
modified en bane on other grounds, 461 F.2d

VICKERY
the examination because of the use of
"Black English." As the majority proJr
erly points out, proof of identification of
bar examinees by race may be difficult.
However, the difficulty of proof does not
eliminate its possibility. Surely such difficulty, without more, should not bar, in
the context of this case, affording the
plaintiffs the opportunity of offering
any such evide nce at trial.
In addition, the use of the objective
MBE in combination with the essay examination raises a question of the
weight accorded each when the exarni?ers come to the point of ascertaining
final .grades. Also, the selection of cutoff scores, especially when such selection
is not subject to review, may be arbitrary. The legality of such decisions
may not properly be resolved by mere
reference to the good faith judgment of
the bar examiners.7
d.

The reliance by the district court and
the majority on Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners 8 would appear to be misplaced. &hware dealt with the case of
a single, white law school graduate denied the right to take the New Mexico
bar examination on the ground that he
was "morally unfit."
The Supreme
Court decided that the New Mexico bar
examiners did not have a rational basis
for denying the plaintiff that right. The
Court was not called upon to consider
7.

ld. at 1114. I do not mean by this statement
to impugn the integrity of the examiners.
Rather, I suggest only that it is not appropriate to foreclose an attempt by plaintiffs to
establish this fact.

8.

353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 LEd.2d 796
(1957).

1171 (1972); see Armstead ·v. Starkville Mu·
nicipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276,
279--280 (5 Cir. 1972).
4. Brown v. Allen, 34-t U.S. 443, 471, 73 S.Ct.
397, 97 LEd. 469 (1953).
L

482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973).

I. Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate
School District, 462 F .2d 1112, 1114 (5 Cir.
1972).

~--~·~~---~-------------------
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the question whether more than a rational basis for denying admission to the
bar examination to Schware was re-

quired.

7407

reached after trial, that an alleged discriminatory written test used for promoting police officers was reasonably or
rationally job-related. Judge Goldberg
dissented on the ground that the distt-ict
court, and the majority in affirming the
district court, had misconstrued the standard Griggs required.U Neither the per
curiam affirmance of the trial court's
holding in itself nor the per curiam as
clarified by the dissent warrants a rejection out of hand of any utilization whatever of either the Griggs' standard or
the EEOC guidelines.

e.
The EEOC guidelines for employment
testing •. and the principles enunciated in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 10-both of
which require a validation of a suspect
employment test-are at least persuasive
as to the criteria to be applied to the
Georgia bar examination under the facts
of this case. As plaintiffs point out, the
examination here, although not administered by an "employer" for the purpose
f.
of hiring, is for all practical purposes an
Nor do I believe that the recently de'employment test. The applicant who cided Geduldig v. Aiello, 14 relied on by
fails it may not, in any respect, be em- the majority, is in any way controlling.
ployed to practice law within the state. The facts and governing law of Geduldig
Moreover, the philosophy underlying are substantially distinguishable from
the Civil Rights Act would appear to those here. The California unemployencompass this type of examination. As ment compensation disability fund,
the Supreme Court pointed out in which is supplementary to the state's
Griggs : "Under the Act, practices, pro- workmen's compensation program; excedures, or tests neutral on their face, . eludes from its coverage disabilities reand even neutral in terms c:J! intent, can- sulting from ·normal pregnancy and
not be maintained if they operate to childbirth. The Supreme Court, in re'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimi- viewing the exclusion of pregnancy and
natory employment practices." 11
childbirth coverage, did not apply EEOC
The majority declares that Allen v. directives on pregnancy because no inMobile 12 does not permit the Griggs vidious discrimination was perceived. A
standard to be applied in an area other state social welfare program necessarily
than that to which the Civil Rights Act must draw a line somewhere, the Suis expressly directed. In Allen this preme Court stated. The exclusion of
Court, without referring to Griggs or the one disability was not suspect where othEEOC guidelines, affirmed per curiam er comparable disabilities were also exthe decision of the district court judge, cluded.15 The particular disability was
1. Interpreting and implementing Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42
U.S.C .A. § 2000e.
11. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S .Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158
(1971).
11. ld. at 430, 91 S .Ct. at 853.
12. 466 F.2d 122 (5 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1973).

- - --

13.

ld. at 126.

14. 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256
(1974).
15. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971) with
Hunter v . Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557,
21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969).
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sex-related but the decision to exclude it
from ~verage, said the Supreme Court,
was not predicated on sex but on the
limited financial resources available in
the compensation fund. Such reasoning
is not apposite here.

g.
Plaintiffs in this case have established
what amounts to an exclusion from job
opportunities of a disproportionate number of blacks. These facts call for a
stricter standard of review than the
IS.

VICKERY
standard the majority . approves today.
Of even more significance, in a case of
this importance where one of the key
factors in determining illegality will be
the evaluation of motive, it seems particularly inappropriate to employ the device
of summary judgment. 1'
Summary
judgment may be used only when no
genuine issues of fact remain unresolved.
For all the reasons pointed out above,
I would reverse the grant of summary
judgment and remand the case to the
district court for a trial on the merits.

PoDer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 LEd.2d 458
(1962). .

Adm. Office, U.S. Courta-West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn.
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Timely
1.

SUMMARY : This case involves the legality of a written entrance

examination administered to all D. C. police force_ ';£Plicants.

Judge Gesell in

~

1972 upheld the test.

A divided CA DC in 1975 reversed.

D. C. officials now seek

cert.
2.

FACTS: All D. C. police applicants are required to take an entrance

~·

V

examination known as Test 21.

This exam, consisting of 80 multiple choice

questions, was designed by the Civil Service Commission for general use in the

'·;

- 2 federal service to measure verbal ability.

To qualify for the force, police

aspirants must correctly answer 40 of the 80 questions.
has not been marked by minority success.

The operation of the test

Between 1968 and 1971, 57o/o of black

--

applicants failed the test, whereas white applicants experienced a much lower
failure rate of 13o/o.

At the same time that Test 21 was being administered, D. C. officials were
mounting vigorous recruitment efforts aimed at minority applicants.

Between

August 1969 and July 1972, 44o/o of incoming police recruits were black.

During

....

the period when resps failed Test 21 iE, 1970, over 50o/o of incoming policemen were
...
~~~~
..
"---""""
......
black.

The evidence showed that substantial numbers of applicants who successfully

pas sed the test, both black and white, failed to report for duty.
Upon acceptance, a recruit's sucfes s was assured.

The department

religiously followed the practice of not failing any recruits who had been accepted
for the training program.

Additional instruction and other

to push everyone through the school with passing marks.

dispensatio~...

~

were used

'

After failing Test 21, resps intervened in an ongoing class action, alleging
that D. C. 's utilization of the test constituted an unlawful employment practice.
D. C. officials argued that the test was a reliable indicator of applicants' performance
II
"'
in the intensive police training program, the Recruit School. To substantiate their

claim, petrs introduced a validation study by the Commission in 196 7, which
indicated a

~ect

correlation between success on Test 21 arrl subsequent per-

.....__..

...............

formance on tests in Recruit School.

The p olice dep artment, however, could not

show correlations between the test and subsequent job performance.

,.

- 3 Judge Gesell granted res ps' motion for summary judgment.

He admitted

that the raw data showed a disproportionate number of blacks failing Test 21 and
that the number of black police officers, although substantial, was not proportionate
to the city's population mix.

This showing, "while minimal,

"burden of the inquiry" to the department.
emphasized:

Petn, at 48a.

11

sufficed to shift the

Judge Gesell then

(1) that the department had vigorously recruited black policemen;

(2) that the evidence showed the need for considerable verbal skills both in the
Recruit School and on the job; and (3) that many blacks, numbering in the hundred ,

----

----

pas sed Test 21 but for other reasons failed to report for duty .

.......___

-

A divided CA DC reversed.

The majority held that the test indisputably had

a racially disproportionate impact, since the failure rate among blacks was more
than four times that of whites.

Given this effect, the department's vigorous

rnino,rity recruitment policies were irrelevant, because under Griggs v. Duke
·'

Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, an employer's innocent motives were not a relevant
criterion.

Due to the disproportionate racial impact, a "heavy burden" rested on

petrs to prove that the test bears a demonstrable relationship to
performance.

suc~es

sful job

The majority admitted for purposes of argument that "Test 21 is

predictive of further progress in Recruit School.
correlation did not prove job-relatedness.

11

Petn, at 12a-13a.

But this

First, no relationship was shown

between test scores and trainability, since the department did not prove that
recruits with lower scores were harder to train, and since no persons who fail
the test are admitted to Recruit School.

Second, no correlation was reflected

between both Recruit School scores and Test 21 scores and examinees' subsequent

- 4 -

Judge Robb dissented.

Admitting that his was a "common sense" approach,

he primarily took issue with the majority's unstated conclusion that verbal ability
is unrelat e d to a policeman's job.

He concluded that Test 21 on its face is a fair

test of recruit ability.
3.

CONTENTIONS : P etrs contend that the CA majority misapplied Griggs,

by finding invalidity on the basis of minority pass-fail data alone, despite a
"favorable" correlation between minority recruitment percentages and minority
population percentages.
Court's guidance.

Resps say that the majority correctly followed this

An adverse racial impact was shown, thus the burden of proof

shifted to petrs, who did not prove that Test 21 predicted trainability.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The majority's result is arguably consistent with some of

Griggs' sweeping language prohibiting any employment practice which cannot be
shown to be related to job performance if an adverse racial impact results.

But

Griggs has plainly been cut fro_El _its roots, a setting where tests, albeit facially
...............

~-----

...... ~~

neutral, operated to freeze the vestiges of prior discriminatory practices.
at 430.

401 U.S.,

Duke Power's employment tests at is sue in that case were neither

designed nor intended to measure any necessary job skill, a far cry from the
present practice, since everyone seems to admit that verbal skills are job-related
in nature.

Moreover, job correlation has in fact been established to an extent in

Q,\\ rec.r-.\-b

this case.

The Commission's validity study shows a clear correlation between

Q.'letN~\l
f"~ttcl)

high Test 21 scores and high marks on Recruit School exams.

!M+ t>\1\ce

-

vre?

S"*'t\~L.... ~
"~ ~

~~
~~

9

It hardly strains

credulity to conclude that part of "job performance" is successful participation in
and completion of Recruit School, although it must be added that the Recruit School
exams have not themselves been judicially analyzed.

Despite this nexus, theCA

OV\ ~ $ C>. ~-ptc.A-

of '',io\o ~~~caMC.e'•
\s rtA~ \\~k.A.

..

- 5 majority disingenuously concluded that Recruit School success of applicants who
fail Test 21 cannot be divined, because the police department rejects unsuccessful
examinees.

That conclusion is, of course, self- evident, and permitting it legal

significance operates to place an unprovable burden on employers who do not
hire a few unsuccessful examinees to provide a sample pool for comparison purposes.

*

On the other hand, the most telling argument in favor of the result below is
that E2. correlation could be shown between Test 21 scores and post-Recruit School
job performance.

The issue therefore becomes whether a lesser showing of job-

relatedness, i.e., that entrance test scores predict performance on training school
(exams, is sufficient when successful efforts are concurrently underway to recruit
minority members.
There is a res pons e.
Starr
8/22/75
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Washington v. Davis

I would apply straight equal protection analysis
to this case and reverse and remand.

If standards derived

from Title VII cases are applied, I would affirm the decision
of the court of appeals

(!.~.,

remand for determination

of appropriate remedy).
I.

What Standards Should Be Used?
This case was brought under the Equal Protection

Clause and § 1981.

In reviewing such a case, the Court must

first decide the question, discussed in my memo on No. 74-768,
~,.....,~p"':C'g

Brown v. General Services Administration (to be argued next
week), whether§
1981 is a waiver
of sovereign
immunity
:wa,...-.,
._.,..-..,
..
.....
~

applicable
to the federal
government.
,.......,
.-.._.
w::"'
,.-..
-~._.

24

As I said there, I

am inclined to think that it is.
This problem aside, there is the further question
whether the court's inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause
is identical to that required by cases, such as Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), decided under Title VII.

2.

Both parties - and the courts below - assumed
·

( n11po.cl? jop - re.la.,~c\ ~) -

-

t~at the i~iries ! et _fort!;_ in Griggs "ar~appro§rliate.

The' issue is not briefed at all.

But I am unconvinced.

It is not surprising that the applicability of Title VII
standards has been assumed.

The lower courts have generally

made no distinction between Title VII standards and those
appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause.
cases cited in CADC opinion, at 3a n. 2.

See,~·~·'

And this Court,

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 14
(1973), a Title VII case, cited lower court equal protection
cases that applied the Griggs standard as support for the
proposition that employment tests with an exclusionary effect
on minorities must be shown to be job-related.
But in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), a
sex discrimination case, the Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny unless a classification was explicitly gender-based
or was a "mere" pretext "designed to effect invidious
discrimination."

417 U.S. at 496-497 n. 20.

"impact" on women as a class was insufficient.

An adverse
Title VII, in

contrast, explicitly prohibits any employment practice that tends
to deprive an employee of opportunities because of his or her
sex.

Geduldig makes it clear that, at least where sex

"'

................

~

discrimination is involved,

Protection Clause _gnd
«.~ oWr'lCLt!J e~ pro~ffi<l'Y\ "Tau'
Title VII are not coextensive. The question before us in this
t~ l

I

~

case is:

~

~

A

When racial discrimination is alleged, is discriminatory

3.

impact on blacks sufficient to call for the demanding scrutiny
of the "compelling state interest" test, or must plaintiffs
demonstrate that the classification is either explicitly
race-based or a mere pretext before the court will engage in
strict scrutiny?
The CA did not rely only on other lower court cases in
ro..\her -\-~ Ct'd\nO-nj e ~ t'tc \-<..&.em a.na.ttts '"s

deciding to apply Title VIIJA It also pointed out that, although
Title VII was not applicable to federal employees at the time
respondents here intervened, it was made applicable to federal

{The

1972 (the year of the district court decision).

co~f a_.epeals said that the plaintiffs ''unquestionably

---

- -

-

II
are
-... entitles;],
_.......,. to_ the benefit of the
..__ amendment.

p. 3a n. 2.
be

~equired

?

~

CADC opinion,

This is true in that the district court may
to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to

allege a cause of action under Title VII.
Lynn, 504 F. 2d 267 (C.A.D.C. 1974).

Compare Womack v.

But it does not mean

that

the court of appeals may treat the case as if the complaint

J

presented a basis for jurisdiction that was not in fact alleged.
In this respect, the case differs from those situations in which
the rule of law governing a given cause of action is modified
while litigation is in process; in those situations the new
rule is to be applied without any need for modification of
the complaint.

This case is different.

If respondents had

filed an original action after Title VII became applicable to
ha.d
them but failed to allege any cause of action other than equal

"

.

protection and § 1981, the court would not assume that a Title
VII action was intended.

Certainly this would be in the case

if the action were brought by private employees.

As this

Court said, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454

--

(1975), § 1981 and Title VII are separate and distinct 'remedies.
Moreover, if the employees had expressly based their complaint
upon Title VII they would be required to exhaust the

____

-

--

administrative remedies incorporated into that statute.
,.~

~~

It

is not clear that such exhaustion is required before a § 1981
suit can be brought.

See my memo in Brown.

If Title VII analysis is to be applied in equal
protection cases, there will be less incentive for employees
to use Title VII procedures, with their attendant limitations.
Title VII, in distinction to § 1981, imposes a limitation on
back pay.

Depending on our decisions in Brown and in Chandler v.

Roudebush (No. 74-1599), also to be argued next week, it may
also impose a more stringent exhaustion requirement and allow
only limited judicial review in federal employment discrimination
cases.
If the Title VII analysis spelled out in Griggs is not
to be adopted automatically, we must look to ordinary equal
protection analysis.

In equal protection cases, my cursory

~~~----------~---review indicates ~scr~i~
atory _imp! ct in itself has not been

!

sufficient to call for strict scrutiny.
the only case that has taken this position.

Geduldig is not
An example in the

~.JI~c:.-~~i.a~ ~ ~~~~
~~~

5.

racial discrimination area is James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.

137 (1971), in which the Court upheld a California constitutional
requirement that low-rent housing projects be subject to
approval by referendum.

The Court distinguished a case where

the referendum requirement turned explicitly on the involvement
of race.

It said that the challenged requirement was neutral

on its face and did not appear to be aimed deliberately at
a racial minority.

402 U.S. at 140-141.

In cases where

"impact" alone has been found to be sufficient, the Court
has suggested that the statute or regulation, although neutral
on its face, in fact concealed a racially discriminatory
motive or purpoo e.

E.~.,

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339

(1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

No such

suggestion has been or can be made in this case.
~

~
~

L' ~
~ J~·, ~

The approach required by Title VII is quite different.
n inquiry into impact is required by the statute - as is

4'~~ppropriate

given the Act's remedial purpose.

If strict scrutiny of the test challenged here is

~

not required under ordinary equal protection analysis, the
test should survive the challenge.

Verbal facility does

----------~--

---

b: ar c:_r~tional __::;a t;,!on;,.h ip _!:o ~he c,~m:=ca; ion skil:.= ~
ability to grasp complex legal concepts that
~._..

pe

ce o~r.

....... ,.-..

Lw;7't

m~k

c:r=s~~""'l:4£1~

a successful
........

.._

~

f

6.

This Court must decide (either explicitly or
implicitly) whether ordinary equal protection analysis or
Title VII law is to be applied in this case.

But I doubt

that this very important question should be decided on the
briefs we have, for they do not address the issue at all.
Perhaps rea rgument and additional briefing should be arranged,
if there is any sentiment to do this in the Conference.

If

it is decided eventually that equal protection analysis is
appropriate, the case should be remanded so that the
complaint can be amended.

I realize that all this sounds

like a drastic move this late in the game, but it is
better to do this than to constitutionalize Griggs and Title
VII sub silentio.
Because you may prefer to apply Title VII analysis
and reach the questions briefed by the parties, I will discuss
those issues too:
II.

T.......
...'~Y.iT '~

Have Re spondents Proved that the Test Has a Discriminatory
Impact?
The district judge, all three members of the court of

appeals panel, and the SG agree that respondents have established

7.

that

th~

t~t

used by the Department has an adverse impact

on black applicants.

I agree that this impact has been

sufficiently established by proof of greatly disproportionate
(over four-to-one) pass-fail ratios.

There is also evidence

that the number of blacks employed is not proportionate to
the number of black residents in the District of Columbia area,
although the Court of Appeals did not rely on these statistics.
Petitioners argue that these data do not establish an
adverse impact where the test does not select applicants for
hire in a pattern significantly different from the pool of
applicants.

(Blacks constituted 53% of all applicants in 1970-71 and

43% of those selected for appointment.)

Moreover, petitioners

argue, the percentage of new black recruits since 1969 (44%)
correlates favorably with the percentage of eligible blacks
residing within a 50-mile radius of the city.

But, even if

these figures - which focus on a limited time period and a
very large geographic area - provided some indication that the
Department has hired blacks in numbers proportionate to their
representation in the applicant pool and in the population at
large, respondent's prima facie case relying on pass-fail rates

}

would not be disturbed.
Some lower courts have held that "disparate population
figures" are sufficient, even in the absence of an unbalanced
pass-fail rate, to establish that an employment practice has a
discriminatory impact.

See cases cited in CADC opinion at 8a

8.

n. 25.

Others have used population data to corroborate

a showing of adverse impact based on pass-fail rates.
cases cited id. at 8a n. 26.

See

But I could find no case that

used population data to rebut clearly disproportionate passfail rates or required disparate population rates figures in
addition to pass-fail rates in order to establish a prima
facie case of impact.

Indeed, it makes no sense to say that

strong hiring statistics in themselves can destroy a prima
facie case in the face of highly disporportionate pass-fail
rates, for blacks may have been hired at a rate even greater
than their proportion in the applicant pool had the results
of the discriminatory test not been a factor in the hiring
decision.
Petitioners also suggest that their active effort
to recruit black applicants should be taken into account in determining whether the challenged test has an adverse impact.
And the SG suggests that, if the case is to be remanded,
petitioners be permitted to introduce evidence that the
recruiting program has affected the applicant pool in such a
way as to produce atypical pass-fail rates.
An active recruitment program in itself should not
be enough to rebut a showing that a test used to screen the
applicants has a discriminatory impact.

No amount of

affirmative effort in attracting minorities to apply for a job

9.

will be effective if those that do apply are then faced with
an artificial barrier to employment, such as a discriminatory
test with no job-related purpose.

~~~··"~
ca-.~.~

Nor am I persuaded by the SG's argument that the
pass-fail data may be atypical.

First, the data in this

case do not support the argument that the recruitment effort
may have influenced the pass-fail rate.

There was no increase

in the percentage of black applicants during the recruitment
period.

In fact, there was a decrease from 66.3% in 1968 and 70.3%

in 1969, to 52.1% in 1970 and 55.6% in 1971.

App. 34.

Between 1969 and 1971, black applications declined by 0.6%
and white applications increased by 88%.
6-7 n. 10.

Resp. Br. at

Moreover, there was no change in the black-white

pass-fail ratios after the recruitment program was begun.
In the years 1968-1971, black pass rates were 45.6%, 41.4%,
44.7%, and 43.2%, respectively, while white pass rates were
84.7%, 84.5%, 87.7%, and 88.1%.

App. 34.

It might be argued that, in another case with
different data, the impact of affirmative recruitment efforts
on pass-fail rates should be taken into account in order to
avoid the discouragement of affirmative efforts by employers
who fear that a wider, less qualified black applicant pool
will cause a previously neutral test to exhibit a discriminatory
pass-fail rate.
some merit.

On its face, this argument appears to have

But it makes no logical sense.

The response to

10.

the problem is provided by the job-related prong of
the Griggs test, rather than by finding that no "impact"
exists.

If unqualified blacks are being drawn into the

applicant pool by the recruitment effort, they can be
screened out legitimately by a job-related test.
~-job-related

If a

test exhibits a discriminatory pass-fail rate

when the pool of black applicants has been widened, the test
should be eliminated, for its only purpose is to screen out
the discriminated against class.

I

In short, an employer has

a legitimate interest in preserving his testing program
only if it is job-related.

Again, we must be mindful that

an affirmative effort to recruit black applicants is

meaningless if the employer retains a discriminatory test that
weeds out black applicants without a job-related reason.
Petitioners argue that the court should not inquire
into discriminatory impact unless there is some evidence
of prior overt discrimination.

This argument is based on the

language in Griggs to the effect that "[u]nder [Title VII],
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of in~ ent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."

401 U.S. at 430 . (emphasis added).

Where there are no "prior discriminatory employment practices,"
petitioners argue, a test neutral on its face and in intent
is acceptable under the Act.

This is not an implausible argument.

11.

In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the
other Supreme Court case involving discriminatory testing, there
was a prior history of segregation of employees.

But I find

it difficult to limit the requirements of Griggs to cases with
an overt history of segregation.

The effect would be to

allow present discrimination (in effect, if not in intent)
by some employers and not by others.
is not so limited.
§

The language of Title VII

Section 703(a)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

2000e-2(a)(2), prohibits any employer from "classify[ing]

his employees in any way which would deprive any individual
of employment opportunities • . • because of such individual's
race."

This
is an "impact" test not limited to situations
....... ,.,
where a prior history of overt discrimination exists. And
Griggs said that the purpose of the Act is not only to remedy
past overt discrimination but to "achieve equality of employment
opportunities."

401 U.S. at 429.

To that end, "[w]hat is

required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
inv idiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
...

impermissible classification.
III.

,

Id. at 431.

Have Petitioners Established that the Test is Job-related?
The court of appeals held that petitionrs had not

established "job-relatedness" because a relation between an
employment test and "trainability" is not sufficient to establish

12.
"job-relatedness."

It seems clear from the legislative

history that Congress did intend to permit the use of

-

tests "to determine the trainability of prospective employees."
110 Gong. Rec. 13492 (remarks of Senator Tower).
EEOC Regulation S2-2a(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21557.
respect, the court of appeals erred.

See also
In this

But, as the SG

correctly points out, the relationship of an employment
test to trainability can establish that

the test is "job-

related" only if the test is predictive of "properly measured
success" in training and if the training itself is related to
job performance.

Petitioners have not established that either J

of these two relationships exist.
In requiring evidence

that the test is indicative

of success in training, we need not require that the employer
prove that he has set the passing score as low as possible;
given a positive relationship between test scores and success
in training, the passing score can be set anywhere within a
reasonable range.
possible.

The employer can insist on the best employees

Nor need we require the employer to prove that

those who do not pass would perform poorly in the training
program; such proof would be impossible without admitting
every applicant.
The employment test attacked here has a postivt e
correlation to performance on Recruit School examination scores.
But petitioners have not established that the Recruit School

13.

tests reflect success in training.

The problem of

evaluating success is training is somewhat obscured in this
case because, under Police Department policy, every hiree
eventually passes the training program.

But, especially

where both the challenged test and the measure of success in
bo+h
training are written examinations and where the job requires
1\

no skill in taking written examinations, some proof that
the Recruit School scores accurately measure training success
is necessary.

In the absence of such proof, the correlation of

employment and training school test scores may merely indicate
tha t certain applicants are skilled at taking written
examinations.
Petitioner has also failed to offer evidence that the
training program bears on subsequent job performance.

Indeed,

the one study that has been conducted indicated that there
is

~

significant correlation between Recruit School test scores

and subsequent job performance.

See CADC opinion at 13a
f€.Cex\\:.\~

n 44.

And the training programAhas been changed - from

the "academic" approach previously emphasized to a more
practical, "job proficiency" training that presumably deemphasizes skills measured by written tests.
It might appear from this that the appropriate
disposition of the case is to remand for an evidentiary
hearing to develop these questions more fully.

The difficulty

~
~
~

14.

with this is that the parties apparently have no more
evidence to offer.

Petitioners seek to establish job-relatedness

on the basis of the Futransky study conducted in 1967.

But

the inadequacies of that study have been detailed above (it
merely measures the relation of entrance scores to Recruit
School scores and demonstrated that there is no correlation
between the latter scores and job performance).

Moreover, no

new evidentiary studies can be made because the training
program has been modified.

The challenged test is still being

I

administered, but the "academic" training program to which
it was claimed to relate is no longer in existence.
The appropriate step to take under the circumstances
appears to be that taken by the court of appeals - to remand
for determination of the appropriate remedy.

In determining

proper relief, the district court can evaluate the relation
between the test and the new training program.

If there is

a positive relation between test and training and if the new training
program is positively related to job performance, injunctive

I

·relief would be inappropriate.
question of back pay.
chang ~ in

There is the further sticky

The district court may find

that~

the training program and in recruitment techniques

make a it impossible to determine which applicants would have been
c•

ax'«.

hired in the past and thus entitled to back pay.
1\

The difficulties

of that determination are best left to the district court in
the first instance.
Chris
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March 1, 1976
No. 74-1492 WASHINGTON v. DAVIS
See the excellent memorandum of February 23, by Chris.
I dictate this summary primarily to focus on aspects of the
case identified by Chris, and also generally to refresh my
recollection.
~

Case
This case was brought as a class action by Negro
a

licants to the D.C. police force who failed an entrance

exam known as Test 21.

~s~d ~asure

verbal skills;

jgetween 1968 and 1971 some 57% of Negro applicants failed ;
the failure rate for white applicants was 13%.
Successful applicants are required to attend the Recruit
School, an

intensive police training program.

The evidence

showed a direct correlation between success on Test 21 and
subsequent performance on Recruit School tests.

But everyone

who attends the Recruit School is given passing marks; and
no evidence was presented (probably none is available) with
respect to correlation between test scores and subsequent
job performance.
The Complaint
The complaint averred a cause of action under the Equal
Protection Clause and §

198l~ serting

that the test

impermissibly discriminates against Negroes.

·2.

No cause of action is averred under Title VII.

At the

time suit was instituted, Title VII was not applicable to
federal employees.

But the complaint was not amended following

the 1972 extension of Title VII to such employees.
The Courts Below
Judge Gessell granted the government's motion for summary
judgment.

He found that the evidence supported a need for

verbal skills by policemen both in the Recruit School and in
the performance of their duties.

He also emphasized the

vigorous recruiting of Negro policemen, and the absence of
any discriminatory intent.
CADC reversed.

Without addressing the failure of the

complaint to rely on Title VII, it said that the Plaintiffs
"unquestionably are entitled to the benefit of the amendment"
to Title VII.
Sovereign Immunity
The government may not be sued for damages (back pay
is claimed) under the Equal Protection Clause absent a waiver
of sovereign immunity.

We have not decided whether § 1981

constitutes such a waiver.

This is a threshold question in

this case.
Applicable Standard - Equal Protection or Title VII
Lower courts usually have made no distinction between
Title VII standards and those appropriate under the Equal

3.
Protection Clause.

In McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802

n. 14, I cited lower court equal protection cases that applied
the Griggs standard - although we did not address specifically
whether a distinction in standards exist.
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, a sex discrimination
case, we made clear that (at least where sex discrimination is
alleged) the Equal Protection Clause in Title VII is not
•

coextensl.ve.

(

~J

-+-

J~

~A- ~ ~ ~
.l:L/(7 G~"'-'""-

J

1

·-- - , -

Absent a showing that the classification (the test) is
either explicitly race-based or a mere pretext to conceal
discrimination, the strict scrutiny test is not applicable
if this is an equal protection case.
But in a Title VII case a "discriminatory impact" alone
apparently is sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny.
v. Duke Power is so read.

~ ~

)11(

Griggs

c~./A ~

If Viewed as an Equal Protection Case
Despite the failure of CADC (and apparently the parties
in this litigation) to see a different, there are significant
differences - actual and potential - between Title VII and
Equal Protection cases.

In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,

421 U.S. 454, we said that § 1981 and Title VII are separate
and distinct remedies.
Differences include the following:
(i) Employees who sue under Title VII are required
to exhaust administrative remedies.

We have not yet

·4 .
determined whether such exhaustion is required as a
precondition to a 1981 suit.

The issue is before us

in Brown v. GSA.
(ii) If the "strict scrutiny" Title VII analysis
also applies in Equal Protection cases, employees are
unlikely to use Title VII procedures.

In addition to

requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, Title
VII imposes a limitation on back pay.

No such limitation

exists under § 1981.
if
Thus,/the standards of liability are identical (i.e.
scrutiny in both situations) there will be a
for employees to use Title VII procedure contrary to congressional
intent.
Equal Protection Analysis
As Geduldig refused to apply strict scrutiny to a sexbased discrimination, there is

Q~ai~~

no reason to apply

it here where no claim is made of a discriminatory intent or
that the test is pretextual.
If the rational basis test is applied, as I believe it
should, the case should be reversed.

Verbal facility bears

to the communication skills.

Moreover,

such skill.
But the parties have not briefed this case on this basis.
We could consider setting it for re argument.

5.
If Title VII Applies
The language of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII prohibits an
employer from "classifying his employees in any way which
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities
. . .

bec~ndividual'

test, not limited to

s~tuations

s race".

This is an 'impact"

where a prior history of

'\

discrimination exists.
Both courts below found that this test has an adverse
II

''

impact on Negro applicants.

This shifts the burden to the

government to prove that the test in fact is job related.
The evidence here is scant or nonexistent.

There is evidence

that the test is related to grades in training school, but
~
apparently evid; nce falls shor~ that the training school

-

~

itself is related to job performance.

There is no evidence -

and it would be hard to obtain - relating the test to job
performance.

-

-

CADC remanded the case for evidence on these issues.
It was decided on summary judgment, but it is unlikely that
~

evidence will be forthcoming.

This could mean that plaintiffs

could win, possibly undeservedly, large back-pay awards.

L. F. P. , Jr.

Blackmun, J.

~
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No .. 74-1492
Walter E . Washington, etc., On Writ of Certiorari to
et al., Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Alfred E. Davis et al.
[April -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case involves the validity of a qualifying test
administered to applicants for positions as police officers
in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. The test was sustained by the District Court but
invalidated by the Court of Appeals. We are in agreement with the District Court and hence reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I
This action began on April 10, 1970, when two Negro
police officers filed suit against the then Commissioner
of the District of Columbia, the Chief of the District's
Metropolitan Police Department and the Commissioners
of the United States Civil Service Commission.1 An
1

Under § 4-103 of t he D1strict of Columbia Code, appointments
to the Metropolitan police fo rce were to be made by the Commissioner subJect to the provisions of Title 5 of the United States
Code relatmg to the classified rivil service, The District of Columbia Council and t he Office of Commissioner of the District of
Columbia, established by ReorganizatiOn Plan No. 37 of 1967, were
abolished as of January 2, 1975, and replaced by th E) Council of
the District of Columbia and th.e Office of Mayor of the District
Q{ Columbta..
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amended complaint, filed December 10, alleged that the
promotion policies of the Department were racially discriminatory and sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction. The respondents Harley and Sellers were
permitted to intervene, their amended complaint asserting that their applications to become officers in the
Department had been rejected, and that the Department's recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis
of race against black applicants by a series of practices
including, but not limited to, a written personnel test
which excluded a disproportionately high number of
Negro applicants, These practices were asserted to violate respondents' rights "under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and under D. C. Code
§ 1-320." 2 Defendants answered, and discovery and
2 Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides :
"All persoiL'3 within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
lutve the same right m every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedmgs for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizeiL'3, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, liceiL'3es, and
exactioiL'3 of every kind, and to no other."
Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code provides:
"In any program of recwtment or hinng of individuals to fill
positions in the government of the District of Columbia, no officer
·or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall
exclude or give preference to the res1dents of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of residence,
religion, race, color, or natwnal origin ."
One of the provisions expressly made applicable to the Metropolitan police force by § 4-103 1s 5 U. S. C. § 3304 (a) which
prov1des :
" § 3304. Competitive service, examinations.
" (a) The President may prescribe rules which shall provide, M
nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for,, (1) open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for

74-1492-0PINION
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3

various other proceedings followed. 3 Respon,dents then
filed ~ motion for P!trtial summary judgment with respect to the recruiting phase of the case, seeking a declaration that the test administered to those applying to
become pQlice officer~ is "unlawfully discriminatory and
therefore in violation of the Due Process Clauf)e of the
Fifth Amendment. . . ." No issue under any statute
or regulation was raised by the motion. The District of
Columbia defendants, petitioners here, and the federal
parties also filed motions for summary judgment with
respect to the recruiting aspects of the case asserting
that respondents were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds.4 The District Court
granted petitioners' and denied respondents' motions.
Davis v. Washington, 34:8 F. Supp. 15 (DC 1972).
According to the findings and conclusions of the District Court, to be accepted by the Department ~nd to
enter an intensive 17-week training program, the police
vecruit was required to satisfy certain physical and
character standards, to be a high school grad~ate or its
appointment in the competitive service which are practical in char.
acter and as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test thet
relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment
sought; and
" (2) noncompetitive examinatiqns when competent applicants do·
not compete after notice has been given of the existence of thevacancy."
The complaint asserted no claim under § 3304.
8 Those proceedings included a hearing on respondents' motiorn
for an order designating the case as a class action. A ruling on
the motion was held in abeyance and was neve~· granted insofar as·
the record before us reveals.
4
In support of the motion, petitioners and the federal parties·
urged tha,t they were in compliance with all applicable constitutional;.
statutory and regulatory provisions, including the provisions of the
Civil Service Act which since 1883 were said to have establishedl
o\l. "ioh rel~J.tedness" sta.ndard. fot employment ..
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equivalent and to receive a grade of at least 40 on ''Tes~
21 ," which is "an examination that is used generally
throughout the federal service," which "was developed
py the Civil Service Commission not the Police Depart.;
ment" and which was "designed to test verbal ability,
vocabulary, reading an,d comprehension." 348 F. Supp.,
~t 16.
The validity of Test 21 was the sole issue before the
court on the motions for summary judgment. The District Court noted that there was no claim of "an intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory
~tctions" but only a claim that Test 21 bore no relationship to job performance and "has a highly discriminatory
impact in screening out black candidates." 348 F. Supp.,
at 16. Petitioners' evidence, the District Court said,
warranted three conclusions : "(a) The number of black
police officers, while substantial, is not proportionate to
the population mix of the city. (b) A higher percentage
of blacks fail the Test than whites. (c) The Test has
not been validated to establish its reliability for measuring subsequent job performance." Ibid. This showing was deemed sufficient to shift the burden of proof
to the defendants in the action, petitioners here; but the
court nevertheless concluded that on the undisputed
facts respondents were not entitled to relief. The District Court relied on several factors. Since August 1969,
44% of new police force recruits had been black; that
'figure also represented the proportion of blacks on the
.total force and was roughly equivalent to 20-29-year-old
blacks in the 50-mile radius in which the recruiting
efforts of the Police Department had been concentrated.
It was undisputed that the Department had systemati..
'cally and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers
many of whom passed the test but failed to report fot
'duty. The District Court r,~jeeted the assertion th',a:t
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Test 21 was culturally slanted. to favor whites and was
"satisfied that the undisputable facts prove the test to
be reasonably and directly related to the requirements '
of the police recruit training program and that it is
neither so designed nor operated to discriminate against
otherwise qualified blacks." 348 F. Supp., at 17. It
was thus not necessary to show that Test 21 was not only
a useful indicator of training school performance but
had also been validated in terms of job performance"the lack of job performance validation does not defeat
the test, given its direct relationship to recruiting and
the valid part it plays in this process." The District
Court ultimately concluded .that "the proof is wholly
lacking that a police officer qualifies on the color of his
skin rather than ability" and that the Department
"should not be required on this showing to lower standards or to abandon efforts to achieve excellence." 5 348
F. Supp., at 18.
Having lost on both constitutional and statutory issues
in the District Court, respondents brought the case to the
Court of Appeals claiming that their summary judgment
motion, which rested on purely constitutional grounds,
should have been granted. The tendered constitutional
issue was whether the use of Test 21 invidiously discriminated against Negroes and hence denied them due process of law contrary to the commands of the Fifth Amend- ·
ment. The Court of Appeals, addressing that is8ue,
announced that it would be guided by Griggs v. Duke·
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a case involving the
When summary judgment was granted, the case with respect to
discrimina,tory promotions was still pending. The District Court,
however, made the determination and direction authorized by Fed..
Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b) . The promotion issue was subsequently
decided adversely to the original plaintiffs. Davis v. Washington.,
35~ F. Supp. 187 (DC 1972).
'3
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interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and held that the statutory standards
elucidated in that case were to govern the due process
question tendered in this one. 6 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42,
512 F. 2d 956 (1975). The court went on to declare
that lack of discriminatory intent in designing and
administering Test 21 was irrelevant; the critical fact
was rather that a far greater proportion of blacks--.
four times as many-failed the test than did whites.
This disproportionate impact, standing alone and without regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory
purpose, was sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation, absent proof by petitioners that the test was
an adequate measure of job performance in addition
to being an indicator, of probable success in the training program, a burden which the court ruled petitioners had failed to discha.rge. That the Department
had made substantial efforts to recruit blacks was beside
the pomt and the fact that the racial distribution of re~
cent hirings and of the Department itself might be
roughly equivalent to the racial makeup of the surround~
ing community, broadly conceived, was put aside as a
"comparison [not] material to this appeal." 168 U. S.
App. D. C., at 46 n. 24; 512 F. 2d, at 960 n. 24. The
Court of Appeals, over a dissent, accordingly reversed
the judgment of the District Court and directed that
respondents' motion for partial summary judgment be
"Although appellants' complaint did not allege a violation of
Title VII of the CIVil Rights Act of 1964, which then was inapplicable to the Federal Government, decisions applying Title VII
furnish additional instruction as to the legal standard governing the
issues raised in this case The many decisions dtsposing of employment discrimination clatms on constitutional grounds have made no
distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory
standard tmder Tttle VII." Footnote 2 of the Court of Appeals
opimon, 168 U. S. App D C., at 44 n. 2, 512 F . 2d, at 958.
6
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granted. We granted the petition for certiorari, 423
U. S. 820 (1975), filed by the District of Columbia
officials.7

II
Because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
legal standards applicable to Title VII cases in resolving
the constitutional issue before it, we reverse its judgment
in respondents' favor. Although the petition for certiorari did not present this ground for reversal, 8 our Rule
40 (l)(d) (2) provides that we "may notice a plain error
not presented"; 9 and thie is an appropriate occasion to
invoke the rule.
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII/ 0 em..
1 The Civil Service Commissioners, defendants in the District
Court, did not petition for writ of certiorari but have filed a brief
as respondents. See our Rule 25 (4) . We shall at times refer to
them as the "federal parties."
8 Apparently not disputing the applicability of the Griggs and
Title VII standards in resolving this case, petitioners presented
issues going only to whether Griggs had been misapplied by the
Court of Appeals.
9 See, e. g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962); Brother•
hood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 ( 1947);
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co ., 312 U. S. 1, 16 (1941); Mahler v. 8by,
264 U. S. 32, 45 (1924); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349,
362 (1910) .
10 Although Title VII standards have dominated this case, this
is not a Title VII case. The statute was not applicable to federal
employees when the complaint was filed . The 1972 amendments
extendmg the title to reach government employees were adopted
prior to ~he District Court's judgment, but the complaint was not
amended to state a claim under that title, nor did the ca:se thereafter proceed as a Title VII case. Respondents' motion for partial
summary judgment, filed after the 1972 amendments, rested solely
on constitutional grounds; and the Court of Appeals ruled that the
motion should have been granted .
At the oral argument before this Court, when petitioners' counsel
was asked whether "this is just a purely Title VII case as it come!3'
t<.>. us from the Covrt Q( Appeals w\thQut any constitutional over-

.,.
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ployees or applicants proceeding under it need not con ..
cern themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially
differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion
practices. This is not the cop.stitutional rule. We have
never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidiol.l.s racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today.
The .central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race. It is ·also
true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting
the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups . . Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U. S. 497 (1954). But our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without re-·
gard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.
Almost 100 years ago, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100'
U. S. 303 (1879), established that the exclusion of Negroes froq1 grand and petit juries in criminal proceedings·
violated the 1 Equal Protection Clause, but the fact that·
a particular jury or a series of juries does not statistically
reflect the racial composition of the community does not·
in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden
by the Clause. "A purp·ose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the prescribed race or by an unequal'
!tPPlication of the law to such an extent as to show intentones," counsel responded : "My trouble honestly with that proposition is the procedural requirements to get into court under Title:
VII and. this case has not lllet th.em." Tr .. Qf Oral Arg_., at 66.
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tional discrimination." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
403-404 (1945) . A defendant in a criminal case is entitled "to require that the State not deliberately and
systematically deny to the members of his race the right
to participate as jurors in the administration of justice."
See also Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U. S. 320, 335337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287-290
(1950); Patton v. M'ississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 468-4.69
(1947) .
The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964) , upheld a New York
congressional apportionment statute against claims that
district lines had been racially gerrymandered. The challenged districts were made up predominantly of whites or
of minority races, and their boundaries were irregularly
drawn . The challengers did not prevail because they
failed to prove that the New York legislature "was either
motivated by racial' considerations or in fact drew the
districts on racial lines"; the plaintiffs had not shown
that the statute "was the product of a state contrivance
· to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin." 376
U. S., at 56, 58. The dissenters were in agreement that
the issue was whether the "boundaries ... were purposefully drawn on racial lines." 376 U. S., at 67.
The school desegregation cases have also adhered to
the basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose. That there are both predominantly black and
predominantly white schools in a community is not alone
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essential element of de jure segregation is "a current condition
of segregation resulting from intentional state action . . .
the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to
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segregate." Keyes v. School District No . 1, 413 U. S.
189, 205, 208 (1973) . See also id., at 199, 211, 213.
The Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial
discrimination based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the
Social Security Act because "the acceptance of appellant's
constitutional theory would render suspect each differ·
ence in treatment among the grant classes, however hook..
ing the racial motivation and however rational the treat.
ment might be." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535,
548 (1972). And compare Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S.137 (1971).
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory
racial purpose must be e~press or appear on the face of
the statute, or that a law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of
l'acial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on
its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discrim.
inate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
'356 ( 1886). It is also clear from the cases dealing with
racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the
systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an "unequal
application of the law .. . as to show intentional discrimination."· Akins v. Texas, supra, at 404. Smith v. Texas,
·311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354
(1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881). A
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved
as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury
combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to
be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community, Hill
-v. 'Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 ( 1942) , or with racially non·
neutral selection procedures, Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625 (1972); Avery.v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967). With a prima.
facie case made out, "the burden of proof shifts to the
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State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action
by showing that permissible racially neutral self)ction criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic
result." Alexander, supra, at 632. See also Turner v,
Fouche, 396 U.S. 3'l6, 361 (1970); Eub'anks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958).
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose must
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another. It is also not infre ..
q1.1ently true that the discriminatory impact-in the jury
cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate
exclusion of Negroes from jury venires-may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in
various circumst11nces it is very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that
a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may
effect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does
not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S.
184 ( 1964), that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations.
There ·are some indications to the contrary in our
cases. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971),
the city of Jackson, Miss. , following a court decree to this
effect, desegregated all of its public facilities save five
swimming pools which had been operated by the city
and which , following the decree, were closed by ordinance
pursuant to a determination by the city council that
closure was necessary to preserve peace and order and
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that integrated pools could not be economically operated.
Accepting the finding that the pools were closed to
avoid violence and economic loss, this Court rejected the
argument that the abandonment of this service was inconsistent with the outst~:j.nding desegregation decree and
that the otherwise seemingly permissible ends served by
the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrating that
racially invidious motivations had prompted the city
council's action. The holding was that the city was not
overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was
extending identical treatment to both whites and Negroes.
The opinion warned against grounding decision on legis·
lative purpose or motivation, thereby lending support for
the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather
than its purpose is the paramount factor. But the holding of the case was that the legitimate purposes of the
ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were
not open to impeachment by evidence that the council·
men were · actually motivated· by racial considerations.
Whatever dicta the opinion may contain, the decision
did not involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordi·
nance having neutral purposes but disproportionate ra,.
cial consequences.
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S.
451 ( 1972), also indicates that in proper circumstances,
the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory
purpose, is the critical factor. That case involved the
division of a school district. The issue was whether the
division was consistent with nn outstanding order of a
federal court to desegregate the dual school system found
to have existed in the area. The constitutional predicate
for the District Court's invalidation of the divided district was "the enforcement until 1969 of racial segre.
gation in the public school system of which Emporia had
always been a part." Id., at 459. There was thus no
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need to find "an independent constitutional violation."
Ibid. Citing Palmer v. Thompson, we agreed with the
District Court that the division of the district had the
effect of interfering with the federal decree and should
be set aside.
That neither Palmer nor Wright was understood to
have changed the prevailing rule is apparent from Keyes
v. School District No. 1, supra, where the principal issue
in litigation was whether and to what extent there had
been purposeful discrimination resulting in a partially
or wholly segregated school system. Nor did other later
cases, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, and Jefferson v.
Hackney, supra, indicate that either Palmer or Wright
had worked a fundamental change in equal protection
law. 11
Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson, however,
various Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts,
including public employment, that the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official prac~
tice standing alone and without regard to discrimin~ttory
purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination violating·
the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification
going substantially beyond what would be necessary to
validate most other legislative classifications. 12 The
To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable
proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional
adjudication, our prior cases-as indicated in the text-are to the
contrary; and very shortly after Palmer, all Members of the Court
majority in that case joined the Court's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which dealt with the issue of public financing for private schools and which announced, as the Court had
several times before, that the validity of public aid to church-related
schools includes close inquiry into purposes of the challenged statute.
12 Cases dealing w1th public employment include:
Chance v.
Boara of Exammers, 458 F. 2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); Castro
v. Beecher, 459 F . 2d 7Z5, 732'-733 (CAl 1972); Bridgeport Guar-·
dlians v. BriuUgeport Civil/. &!ivi:e C'omm'n, 482 F . 2d 1333, 1331
11

\

\
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cases impressively demonstrate. that there is another side
to the issue; but, with all due respect, we cannot agree
with these decisions.
As an initial matter, we have ·difficulty understanding
how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification
for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and
denies "any person equal protection of the_laws" simply
because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify
than members of other racial or ethnic groups. Had re·
spondents, along with all others who had failed Test 21,
whether white or black, brought an action claiming that
'the test denied each of them equal protection ·of the laws
·as compared with those who had passed with high enough
(CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1200
(Md.), aff'd in pertinent part, sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.
2d 1134 (CA4 1973); Douglas v. Hampton, U. S. App. D. C.
- , 512 F. 2d 976, 981 (1975); but cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517
F. 2d 1089, 1096-1097 (CA5 1975), petition for certiorari pending,
No. 75-1026 0. T . 1975. There are also District Court cases: Wade
v. Misstssippi Co'Operative Extension Service, 372 F. Supp. 126, 143
(ND Miss. · 1974); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737
(ND Ohio .1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp.
543, 553 (ND Ill. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp.
721, 724 (Minn. 1972), reversed on other grounds, 498 F. 2d 143
(CA8 1974) .
In other contexts there are Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevolpment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban renewal); Kennedy
Park Homes Assn., Inc. v. City of Lackawana, 436 F. 2d 108, 114
(CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970) (zoning); Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F. 2d 291
(CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning) ; Metropolitan H. D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F. 2d 409 (CA7 1975), cert. granted
December 1~, 1975, U. S. (zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney,
448 F . 2d 731 , 738 (dictum) (CA7 1971) (public housing); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (ND Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F . 2d 788
(CA5 1972) (public housing) ; Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d
1286 (CA5 W71), aff'd on rehearing en bane, 461 F. 2d 1171 (1972)
~municipal serv1ces).
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scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most unlikely that their challenge would have been sustained.
Test 21, which is administered generally to prospective
government employees, concededly seeks to ascertain
whether those who take it have acquired a particular
level of verbal skill; and it is untenable that the Constitution prevents the government from seeking modestly to
upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees
rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing. Respondents,
as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the
test denied them equal protection than could white applicants who also failed. The conclusion would not be
different in the face of proof that more Negroes than
whites had been disqualified by Test 21. That other
Negroes also failed to score well would, alone, not demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied
equal protection of the laws by the application of an
otherwise valid qualifying test being administered to
prospective police recruits.
Nor on the facts of the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion
that it is a purposeful device to ·discriminate against
Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional
rights of respondents as well as other black applicants.
As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and
rationally may be said to serve a purpose the government is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even
agreeing with the District Court that the differential
racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we
think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to
recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of
'"-e, re~ruit. classes 3nd of the {Qrce in general, and th~

'•
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relationship of the test to the training program negated
any mference that the Department discriminated on the
basis of race or that "a police officer qualifies on the
color of his skin rather than ability." 348 F. Supp.,
at 18.
Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring
and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and that it is an
insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis
for the challenged practices. It is. necessary, in addition,
that they be "validated" in terms of job performance in
any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the
minimum skill, ability or potential necessary for the
position at issue and determini:ng whether the qualifying
tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in question. 13 However this process
13 It appears beyond doubt by now that there is no single method
for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship
to job performance. Professional standards developed by the
Ameman Psyc.hological Association in its Standards for Educational
and Psychological Tests and Manuals (1966), accept three basic
methods of validation: "empuical" or "criterion" validity (demonstrated by identifying cntena that indiCate successful job performance and then correlating test scores and the criteria so identified),
"construct" validity (demonstrated by examinations structured t~
measure the degree to which job applicants have identifiable charactenstics thQ,t have been determined to be important in successful
JOb performance), and "content" validity (demonstrated by tests
whose content closely approximates tasks to be performed on the
JOb by the applicant). These standards have been relied upon by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in fashioning its
Gmdelines on Employment Selection procedures, 29 CFR pt. 1607,
and have been Judicmlly noted in cases where validation of employment tests has been in ISSue. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 431 (1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S.
App. D. C. 62, 512 F. 2d 976, 984 (1975); Vulcan Society v. Civil
Serv1ce Comm'n, 490 F 2d 387, 394 (CA2 1973) .
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proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of,
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is a.ppropria.te under
the Constitution where special racial impact, without
discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed
to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes
of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments
in cases such as this.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
of tax, welfa.re, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that ma.y be more burdensome to the poor and
to the avera.ge black than to the more affluent white. 14
Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps inevitably follow. However, in our view, extension of
the rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public
employment, should await legislative prescription.
As we have indicated, it was error to direct summary judgment for respondents based on the Fifth
Amendment.
14 Goodman, De facto School Segregation: Constitutional and Empirica.l Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 300 ( 1972), suggests that disproportionate impact analysis might invalidate "tests and qualHications for voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury service
and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ;
[s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees,
and other state-imposed charges." It has also been argued that
minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements would require ma.jor modifications in light of the un. equal impact rule. Silverman, Equal Protection Economic Legislation and Racial Discrimination, 25 Vand. L. RElY. 1183 (1972). See
~l&o PeJ;Dsetz, Minorities tn the Market Place, 43 N. C. L. Rev. 271.

I

I

74-1492-0PINION

18

WASHINGTON v. DAVIS

III
W·e also hold that the Court of Appeals should have
affirmed the judgment of the District Court granting ·the
motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and
the federal parties. Respondents were entitled to relief
on ne1ther constitutional nor statutory grounds.
The submission of the defendants in the District
Court was that Test 21 complied with all applicable statutory as well as constitutional requirements; and they
appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and
regulations governing their conduct standards similar to
those obtaining under Title VII had to be satisfied. 15
The District Court also assumed that Title VII stand. ards were to control the case, identified the determinative
issue as whether Test 21 was sufficiently job related and
· proceeded to uphold use of the test because it was
"directly related to a determination of whether the applicant possesses sufficient skills requisite to the demands
of the curriculum a recruit must master at the police
academy." 348 F. Supp., at 17. The Court of Appeals
reversed because the relationship between Test 21 and
u In their memorandum supporting their motion for swnmary
judgment, the federal parties argued :
"In Griggs, supra, the Supreme Court set a job-relationship standard
for the private sector employee;; which has been a standard for
federal employment since the passage of the Civil Service Act in
1883. In that act Congres::; has mandated that the federal government must use ' . . examinations for testing applicants for appointment ... which .. as far as possible relate to matters that fairly
test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the
appomtments sought.' 5 U.S. C. §3304 (a)(l). Defendants contend that they have been following the job-related standards of
Grtggs, supra, for the past eighty-eight years by virtue of the
enactment of the Civil Service Act which guaranteed open and fair
competitiOn for Jobs."
They went on to argue th<l:t the Griggs standard had been satisfied.
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training school success, if demonstrated at all, did not
satisfy what it deemed to be the crucial requirement
of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21
and performance on the policeman's job.
We agree with petitioners and the federal respondents
that this was error. The advisability of the police recruit training course informing the recruit about his
upcoming job, acquainting him with its demands and
attempting to impart a modicum of required skills seems
conceded. It is also apparent to us, as it was to the
District Judge, that some minimum verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential,
to satisfactory progress in the training regimen. Based
on the evidence before him, the District Judge concluded
that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of
the police training program and that a positive relationship between the test and training course performance
was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from
its possible relationship to actual performance as a police
officer. This conclusion of the District Judge is supported by regulations of the Civil Service Commission,
by the opinion evidence placed before the District Judge
and by the current views of the Civil Service Commissioners who were parties to the case.16 Nor is the
16 See n. 17, infra.
Current instructions of the Civil Service
CommiSSIOn on "Exammmg, Testing, Standards, and Employment
PractiCes" provide in pertinent part .
"S2-2-Use of applicant appraisal procedures
"a Policy. The Commission's staff develops and uses applicant
appraisal procedures to assess the knowledges, skills, and abilities of
persons for jobs and not persons in the abstract.
11
( 1) Appraisal procedures are designed to reflect real, reasonable,
and necessary qualifications for effective job behavior.
11
(2) An appraisal procedure must, among other requirements,.
have a demonstrable and rational relationship to important job-·
related performance objectives identified by Illilnagement, such as.:.:
11
(a) Effective job l?erformance ;
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conclusion foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); and it seems to
us the much more sensible construction of the job re~
latedness requirement.
The District .Court's accompanying conclusion that
Test 21 was in fact directly related to the requirements
of the police training program was supported by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record; 17
11

(b) Capability;
"(c) Success in training;
" (d) Reduced turnover; or
" (e) Job satisfaction." 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (Oct. 12, 1972).
See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on
Employment Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.5 (b) (3), discussed in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U, S. 405, 430-435
(1975) .
:17 The record includes a validation study of Test 21's relationship
to performance in the recruit training program. The study was
made by D. L. Futransky of the Standards Division, Bureau of
Policies and Standards, United States Civil Service Commission.
Appendix, at 99-109. Findings of the study included data "support[ing] the conclusion that T[ est] 21 is effective in selecting
trainees who can learn the material that is taught at the Recruit
School." App. 103. Opinion evidence, submitted by qualified
experts examining the Furtransky study andjor conducting their
own research, affirmed the correlation between scores on Test 21
and success in the training program. E. g., Affidavit of Dr. Donald
R. Schwartz (personnel research psychologist, U. S. Civil Service
Commission), Appendix, at 178, 183 ("It is my opinion . .. that
Test 21 has a significant positive correlation with success in the
MPD Recruit School for both Blacks and whites and is therefore
shown to be job related ..."); affidavit of Diane E. Wilson (personnel research psychologist, U. S. Civil Service Commission), Appendix, at 185, 186 ("It is my opinion that there is a direct and rational relationship between the content and difficulty of Test 21 and
successful completion of recruit school training:").
The Court of Appeals was "willing to assume for the purposes
of this appeal that appellees have shown that Test 21 is predictive ·
Qf further progress in Recruit SchooV' 512 F . 2d, at. 962 ...
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and we are not convinced that this conclusion was
erroneous.
The federal parties, whose views have somewhat
changed since the decision of the Court of Appeals and
who still insist that training-program validation is sufficient, now urge a remand to the District Court for the
purpose of further inquiry into whether the training program test scores, which were found to correlate with Test
21 scores, are themselves an appropriate measure of the
trainee's mastership of the material taught in the course
and whether the training program itself is sufficiently
related to actual performance of the police officer's task.
We think a remand is inappropriate. The District
Court's judgment was warranted by the record before
him, and we perceive no good reason to reopen it, particularly since we were informed at oral argument that
although Test 21 is still being administered, the training
program itself has undergone substantial modification
in the course of this litigation. If there are now deficiencies in the recruiting practices under prevailing
Title VII standards, those deficiencies are to be directly
addressed in accordance with appropriate procedures
mandated under that section.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.,

So ordered.
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